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Who Can Police the Police?
Joanna C. Schwartzt

ABSTRACT
Recent police killings have prompted a national conversation about the need for
police reform. Most of the conversation has concerned the types of reforms that
might improve policing. Equal consideration should be given to which actors can
most effectively pursue these reforms. In this Essay, I suggest three qualities that
police reformers need in order to influence police behavior: sufficient leverage such
that law enforcement will respond to their pressures, recommendations, or
demands; sufficient motivation to engage in their reform efforts; and sufficient
resources to do their work. I use this framework to assess the efficacy of those most
commonly called upon to reform the police, propose strengthening reformers in the
areas in which they are lacking, and suggest ways in which reformers might
collaborateto draw on their comparative strengths.

I. INTRODUCTION

Several recent high-profile police killings have focused national
attention on longstanding concerns about police bias, police violence,
and the lack of police accountability.' There appears to be a growing
consensus that police need to change and that most are not going to
change themselves.2 The questions, then, are what reforms are needed
and who can help advance them.

t Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Many thanks to the Legal Forum for a thoughtprovoking symposium. For helpful conversations and comments, thanks to Beth Colgan, Rachel
Harmon, Allison Hoffman, Hiroshi Motomura, Jason Oh, David Rappaport, Sam Walker, and the
participants in the Legal Forum symposium. Thanks also to Tori Grant, Jeremy Maltz, Josh
Pickar, Deven Parmar, and Vaishalee Yeldandi of the Legal Forum for their editorial assistance.
1 For one discussion of shifting attitudes about policing, see Wesley Lowery, On Policing, the
National
Mood
Turns
Toward
Reform,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
13,
2015),
https: /www.washingtonpost.com/nationallon-policing-the-national-mood-turns-toward-reform/
2015/12/13/1174efle-aO3f-11e5-a3c5-c77f2cc5a43cstory.html [http://perma.cc/Z4AS-HJBL].

See Sarah Childress, How the DOJ Reforms a Police Department like Ferguson, FRONTLINE
(Mar. 4, 2015), http: /www.phs.org /wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-doj -reforms-a-police-department
-like-ferguson/ [http://perma.cc /YWZ5-KAWZ] (quoting Dean Erwin Chemerinsky as saying that
"[i]t's often hard to reform police departments without external intervention"); David A. Sklansky,
Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 574 (2012) (observing "the nearly
universal assumption that police simply cannot police themselves, and that it is foolish to imagine

437

438

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2016

Much has been written about the first question-the ways in which
law enforcement agencies should change. Commentators have pushed
for a number of reforms in law enforcement agencies' policies and
practices, including the increased use of body cameras, more rigorous
investigations of officer misconduct, more frequent imposition of
discipline for officer wrongdoing, increased data collection, increased
diversification of police forces, and trainings and policies aimed at
minimizing implicit biases and building trust and legitimacy in policed
communities. 3
Although scholars, advocates, commissions, and government
officials have no end of suggestions about how law enforcement
agencies should change, the second question-who is best situated to
advance these reforms-has received less attention. There are a
number of entities engaged in interventions that might lead to police
reforms. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigates and sues
departments engaged in systemic misconduct. Insurers advise smaller
jurisdictions about how to reduce liability risk, and may increase
deductibles or limit coverage when a jurisdiction cannot reduce its
otherwise."). As Professor Sklansky notes, these positions are not universally held. Law
enforcement has, over the past several decades, "vigorously insisted that they have both the
responsibility and the capacity to manage their own affairs-including matters of discipline-free
of external interventions." Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S.
Justice Department 'Patternor Practice"Suits in Context, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 8 (2003).
The United States Supreme Court has also expressed confidence that "the increasing
professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police discipline" works to
deter civil rights violations by law enforcement. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006).
3
For a discussion of the effects of body cameras, see for example, Christopher Mims, What
Happens When Police Officers Wear Body Cameras, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 5:28 AM ET),
http://on.wsj.com/lw6CocS [https:lperma.cc /QY6F-C96F]. For a discussion of the importance of
rigorous internal investigations and officer discipline, see for example, Stephen W. Hawkins,
Police Brutality Must Be Punished If We Want Real Justice for Michael Brown, GUARDIAN (Aug.
14, 2014, 12:45 PM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug /14/police("[A]11
[https://perma.cc /8UKT-BEZN]
brutality-punished-justice-for-michael-brown-ferguson
officers responsible for abuses should be adequately disciplined and, where appropriate,
prosecuted."). For the lack of data about law enforcement practices and the need for such data, see
for example, Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119
(2013). For discussions of the importance of diversifying law enforcement, see for example, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY 18 (U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2001) ("Law enforcement agencies should seek to hire and retain a diverse workforce that
can bring an array of backgrounds and perspectives to bear on the issues the agencies confront
and the choices they must make in enforcing the law."). For suggestions to address implicit bias
through changes in hiring, training, policies, and supervision, see for example, Tracey G. Grove,
http://www.
2011),
(Oct.
CHIEF
Enforcement, POLICE
Implicit Bias and Law
policechiefmagazine.org /magazineindex.cfm?fuseaction=display-arch&article id=2499&issue-id=
102011 [https://perma.cc /KK6D-6G6N]. For the importance of building trust and legitimacy in law
enforcement, see for example, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY

POLICING 9 (May 2015). For a discussion of efforts to use trainings to shift officers from a "warrior"
to "guardian" mentality, see for example, Kimberly Kindy & Zoeann Murphy, Creating Guardians,
Calming Warriors, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2015), http://wapo.st/police-training [http://
perma.cc /AW8H-ZQ79].
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liability exposure. Plaintiffs bring civil suits against officers and
departments for violations of their constitutional rights. Defendants
seek to suppress unconstitutionally seized evidence in individual cases.
Non-governmental organizations, protestors, and reporters raise public
awareness of police wrongdoing and pressure government officials and
law enforcement agencies to act. Prosecutors bring criminal charges
against officers. Elected officials enact laws regulating the police. Blue
ribbon commissions investigate troubled departments after high-profile
events. Civilian overseers review misconduct claims brought against
police and recommend changes in departments' policies and practices.
Commentators have criticized and applauded the ability of these
various actors to influence law enforcement, but have done so without
broader reflection about the qualities that might make reformers
successful in their efforts. 4
In this Essay, I offer a framework with which to evaluate the
relative strengths and limitations of those engaged in efforts to reform
the police. 5 I contend that police reformers need three qualities to have
any hope of influencing police behavior: sufficient leverage such that
law enforcement will respond to their pressures, recommendations, or
demands; sufficient motivation to engage in their reform efforts; and
sufficient resources to do their work.6
Of course, this taxonomy oversimplifies the challenges of reforming
the police. It assumes that law enforcement can, in fact, improve
through the pressures of outsiders. It glosses over what reform efforts
should be pursued and how the impact of those reform efforts could be
measured. And it assumes that it is possible to measure the precise
amount of leverage, motivation, and resources various reformers
possess-an especially difficult task given that reformers often work
serially or simultaneously, in parallel or in concert, to press for reforms.
Despite these limitations, this taxonomy has three important
virtues. First, it offers a framework with which to understand the
strengths and limitations of those engaged in police reform efforts.
Second, it highlights ways in which the leverage, motivation, and
4
For commentators' discussions of the strengths and limitations of various reformers, see
infra Part IIE. For discussion of the need for this type of framework and some comparative
institutional analysis, see Rachel Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 809-16
(2012).
As I suggest in the Conclusion, this framework could also be used to evaluate the strengths
and limitations of those engaged in other types of reform efforts.
6 This Essay considers which entities are best situated to influence police behavior, not
which entities are best situated to design police reforms. Were I considering that question, I would
likely focus on three completely different qualities: access to information, expertise, and
legitimacy. I discuss these qualities briefly in Part IIE, but the question of who should design
police reforms merits more sustained attention.
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resources of current reformers might be adjusted to improve their
efficacy. And, third, by enabling comparison of the strengths and
limitations of various reformers, it facilitates creative thinking about
ways in which they might most productively collaborate. Although
police reformers already regularly work together, my framework can
encourage partnerships that draw on reformers' complementary
strengths.
II. DEFINITIONS
I contend that police reformers need at least some amount of three
qualities-leverage, motivation, and resources-to have any hope of
influencing police behavior. Before considering the extent to which
those currently engaged in police reform efforts possess each of these
three qualities, I will define key terms.
A.

Police Reformers

I define police reformers broadly to include all entities engaged in
efforts to improve policing. Police reformers employ a range of means to
achieve this end. Some push for specific reforms. For example, when
the DOJ enters into a settlement agreement or consent decree with a
law enforcement agency, it negotiates for a set of reforms including
clearer use of force policies; more robust supervision, investigation, and
discipline of officers; and data collection about department practices.'
Civilian auditors and blue ribbon commissions also make specific
policy, supervision, and training recommendations. 8 And federal, state,
and local elected officials enact laws and regulations that require
9
departments to change their behavior in concrete ways.
Other reformers take a bottom-up approach-they sanction
wrongdoing and thereby aim to pressure law enforcement officers and
agencies to improve without setting out exactly what those
See infra note 25 and accompanying text (describing core reforms advocated by the DOJ in
its investigations).
" For reports from blue ribbon commissions recommending changes to law enforcement
policies and practices, see INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991); JAMES G. KOLTS ET AL., THE LOS
ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF 'S DEPARTMENT (1992); RAMPART INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, A REPORT TO
THE Los ANGELES BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS, POLICIES,
AND PROCEDURES OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT IN THE WAKE OF THE RAMPART

SCANDAL (2000). For examples of recommendations made by civilian overseers, see NYC Civilian
Policy Recommendations, http://www.nyc.govfhtml/ccrb/html/
Complaint Review Board,
news/policy.shtml [https://perma.cc /U3WM-LSK7] (reports written by New York City's Civilian
Complaint Review Board, recommending changes to chokehold practices and changes to vertical
patrols in New York City Housing Authority).
9 See infra notes 84 & 85 and accompanying text (describing laws passed by elected officials).
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improvements should be. For example, when a criminal defendant
moves to suppress unconstitutionally seized evidence, the court's
decision to suppress is intended in part to punish the involved officer
and agency, and thereby encourage performance improvements-more
care by the officer, or increased supervision or discipline by the
department. 10 Criminal prosecutions and civil suits are similarly
intended to punish those who violate the law, deter other officers, and
push officials to adopt reforms that might prevent future wrongdoing."
Police reformers also vary in the intended targets of their reform
efforts: Some aim to address policies and practices across an entire
department, while others focus on the behavior of individual officers.
Reformers also focus on different types of policing problems: criminal
suppression motions challenge the unconstitutional collection of
information or evidence by law enforcement; civil damages actions
generally challenge police behavior that results in compensable injury
or property damage; and state and federal legislation has tended, at
least recently, to regulate data collection, body cameras, and the
investigation of officer-involved deaths. 12
In this Essay, I do not assess whether it is better to advocate for
specific reforms or to sanction wrongdoing and thereby pressure officers
and agencies to change their behavior; whether it is better to apply
pressure on individual officers or agencies as a whole; or whether
certain types of policing problems are more important to address than
others. Instead, I assume that each reformer's work plays a valuable <
role in efforts to improve policing and focus, instead, on each reformer's .,
ability to succeed in its efforts.
B.

Leverage

"Leverage" refers to the pressure that a reformer can place on law
enforcement agencies and officers to change their behavior. Most
reformers have leverage by dint of their power to sanction. Prosecutors
can bring criminal charges against officers. Civil plaintiffs can bring

'n See infra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the intended effects of suppression
decisions).
n See infra note 46 and accompanying text (describing the intended effects of civil damages
actions); infra note 76 and accompanying text (describing the intended effects of criminal
prosecutions).
" See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 425-46 (2012) (finding that
Fourth Amendment excessive force claims are litigated almost exclusively in civil suits whereas
claims related to investigatory stops are litigated almost exclusively in criminal suppression
motions); Law Enforcement Overview, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15, 2016),
http: //www.ncsl.org /research/civil-and-criminal-justice/law-enforcement.aspx [https: Iperma.cc /C3

LY-5TWC] (describing state lawmakers' recent efforts to regulate law enforcement).
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damages actions against officers and departments. Criminal defendants
can bring motions to suppress. Federal, state, and local governments
can withhold money from law enforcement agencies that do not adopt
certain policies. The DOJ can sue a law enforcement agency when the
agency refuses to adopt recommended reforms.
Police reformers can also have leverage over law enforcement if
some benefit will accrue to the officers or officials who adopt the
reformers' recommendations. For example, public entity liability
insurers can reduce insurance premiums for law enforcement agencies
that reduce their claims payouts, become accredited, or hire a risk
manager. The federal government can give law enforcement agencies
grant money for community policing initiatives and body cameras.
Whether in the form of a carrot or stick, a police reformer's leverage is
its power to cause law enforcement agencies or officers to adjust their
behavior.
Some have observed that police will not truly improve if they are
merely responding to carrots and sticks. Instead, reforms will endure
only when "the police organization itself is involved in the process and,
ultimately, when reform involves not simply adherence to rules in the
face of punitive sanctions, but a change in the organizational values
and systems to which both managers and line officers adhere." 13 This
may be so-the DOJ's efforts, for example, may be more successful and
enduring when it engages law enforcement officers and other
14
stakeholders in the process of designing and implementing reforms.
Yet I maintain that police reformers generally need some leverage to
ensure law enforcement engages in the reform process: The DOJ may
collaborate with a law enforcement agency's officers and officials to
design and implement reforms but, at the end of the day, the DOJ
relies on and benefits from its leverage to sue an agency that does not
participate in the collaborative process.
C.

Motivation

"Motivation" refers to reformers' commitments to their reform
goals. A reformer can be motivated by any number of interestsideological, moral, altruistic, economic, or political. The interests

Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
13
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 848 (1999); accord Kami C. Simmons, The Politics of
Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement
Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 489, 524 (2008) (describing the importance of stakeholder
involvement in DOJ investigations of law enforcement agencies).
14
I discuss the role of community and stakeholder involvement in designing reforms infra
Part II.E.
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underlying a reformer's motivation may impact the types of reforms it
pursues-a politically motivated legislator might introduce body
camera legislation because it is popular with her constituents, whereas
an economically motivated public entity liability insurer might
recommend that its insureds adopt a certain use-of-force policy because
it is likely to reduce liability costs. For the purposes of this discussion, I
do not take a position on which types of motivations lead to the most
effective reform efforts. Instead, I assume that reformers motivated by
a wide range of interests can influence policing in productive ways. I
focus, instead, on the need for reformers to be motivated to do their
work.
Presumably, anyone engaged in police reform efforts has at least
some motivation to pursue those efforts. Yet a police reformer's
motivation can be compromised in at least two different ways. First, the
reformer may have multiple priorities or responsibilities, and so its
motivation may be diminished if police reform efforts are not its most
urgent priority. Second, a reformer may have other priorities or
responsibilities that conflict with its motivation to pursue police
reforms. Prosecutors, for example, have authority to prosecute law
enforcement officers for criminal misconduct, but their motivation to do
so may be compromised by their desire to maintain positive
relationships with officers in the same agency, who play an important
role in their other investigations and prosecutions.1 5
D.

Resources

"Resources" refer to the time, money, and personnel necessary for
each type of reformer to pursue its reform goals. Resources should be
understood on both a micro and macro level. At a micro level, each
individual reformer needs sufficient time, money, and personnel to
pursue its work with regard to the officer or agency that is the
immediate target of its efforts. At a macro level, each type of reformer
will ideally have sufficient resources to pursue its reforms broadly,
across many law enforcement officers and agencies.1 6
Comparing the resources of the DOJ and criminal defendants
illustrates how the resources question plays out at a micro and macro
level. At a micro level, the DOJ needs far more resources to investigate
a troubled law enforcement agency than an individual criminal
"

See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
I do not have an answer to an obvious next question: how many law enforcement agencies

and officers would a reformer ideally be able to reach? I assume for the purposes of this discussion
that more is better, although additional thought should be given.to the ideal scope of each
reforrner's reach.
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defendant needs to bring a motion to suppress. Even so, the DOJ
appears to be far better resourced than criminal defendants on a micro
level. The DOJ staffs its pattern and practice investigations with
several attorneys and can spend years compiling evidence about a law
enforcement agency's practices.1 7 In contrast, public defenders are
notoriously overworked; in some jurisdictions, defense attorneys have
only minutes to spend on each of their cases and so may not vigorously
litigate-or even file-meritorious motions to suppress.1 8
On a macro level, however, criminal defendants have a resource
advantage over the DOJ. There is just one DOJ but millions of criminal
defendants who might make suppression motions.1 9 To be sure, a DOJ
investigation is aimed at addressing policies and practices across an
entire department, while a suppression motion is aimed at the behavior
of an individual officer (even if a successful motion can have a broader
impact on police behavior). 20 But even with this caveat, criminal
defendants as a whole have far more resources at a macro level than
does the DOJ to pursue their efforts in agencies across the country.
E.

Influence

This Essay engages with a narrow but important question-what
entities are best situated to influence police behavior. This Essay does
not, however, address how the police should change or which entities
are best situated to design police reforms. I am focused not on who has
the capacity to craft police reforms but on who has the muscle to ensure
those reforms are adopted.
Some police reformers work toward both goals simultaneously. For
example, the DOJ, civilian overseers, and blue ribbon commissions both
design police reforms and press police to adopt those reforms. Others-

" See Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 48-49 (2012) (describing the costs associated with the DOJ investigation
of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office).
18 See Hannah Levintova, Charts: Why You're in Deep Trouble if You Can't Afford a Lawyer,
MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2013, 5:00 EST), http:/Iwww.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/publicdefenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts [https://perma.cc /J293-VYGF] (reporting that, on average,
public defenders in New Orleans have seven minutes to spend on each of their cases, public
defenders in Detroit have thirty-two minutes to spend on each of their cases, and public defenders
in Atlanta have fifty-nine minutes to spend on each of their cases); see also infra note 62 and
accompanying text.
19
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (2012), https://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-arrested/

persons-arrested [http://perma.cc /TQ5J-4KF9] (reporting over 12 million arrests by law
enforcement in 2012). Note that not all of these arrestees are charged with a crime.
20 See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text for further discussion of the leverage of
successful suppression motions.
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like prosecutors, civil plaintiffs, and criminal defendants-may press
the police to change without playing a direct role in determining what
those changes should be. And some-researchers, for example-may
design reforms without playing a direct role in encouraging police to
adopt them. I am agnostic about whether those pressing police to adopt
reforms should also play a role in designing those reforms. But I do
believe that the question of who is best situated to influence the police
can be disaggregated from the question of who is best situated to design
reforms.
Were I considering which entities are best situated to design police
reforms, I would not focus on leverage, motivation, and resources.
Instead, I expect that I would focus on three completely different
qualities: sufficient access to information about the law enforcement
agency or agencies that would be subject to reforms so that it would be
possible to determine the scope and nature of the pathologies that need
addressing;
sufficient expertise in policing so that proposed
interventions would address those pathologies; and sufficient
legitimacy with law enforcement and other stakeholders such that
proposed reforms would be embraced-or at least accepted-by those
most directly impacted by them. 21
Further consideration should be given to which entities are
engaged in efforts to design police reforms, and whether those entities
have sufficient information, expertise, and legitimacy to do their work.
This Essay, however, is focused on who is best situated to influence
police behavior and so does not engage with these important questions.
III. APPLICATIONS
Having argued that police reformers need leverage, motivation,
and resources, I now consider the leverage, motivation, and resources
possessed by those most commonly called upon to reform the police. In
this Part, I aim to describe both the structural characteristics of these
actors and the ways in which they actually behave, although I have
glossed over complexities in both areas and readers may disagree with
my characterizations of each reformer's strengths and weaknesses.
Note also that these descriptions of reformers are not wholly, or even
primarily, my own; other commentators have made many of the
observations and critiques that I describe. Nevertheless, situating
commentators' observations within my framework-as observations

21
See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of this type of
collaboration when designing reforms).
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about leverage, motivation, and resources-helps illuminate reformers'
relative strengths and weaknesses and facilitates comparison.
I have organized this discussion in four subparts, each of which
focuses on a group of reformers that share similar strengths and
weaknesses: (1) reformers with lots of leverage but limited resources
(the DOJ and public entity liability insurers); (2) reformers with strong
motivations but limited leverage (civil plaintiffs, criminal defendants,
and non-governmental actors including advocacy groups and the
media); (3) reformers with lots of leverage but mixed motivations
(prosecutors and elected officials); and (4) reformers whose leverage,
motivation, and resources depend upon the preferences of the
government officials who create them (blue ribbon commissions and
civilian overseers). For each reformer, I briefly describe their work and
then assess their leverage, motivation, and resources.
Reformers with Lots of Leverage but Limited Resources

A.

First, I consider two reformers-the DOJ and public entity liability
insurers-that each have significant leverage over law enforcement
agencies but are limited by their resources on a macro level.
1. The Department of Justice.
In 1994, the DOJ was granted statutory authority to investigate
law enforcement agencies for systemic constitutional violations. 22 Since
that time, the DOJ has investigated at least sixty-seven law
enforcement agencies for racial bias, excessive force, and other
constitutional violations. 23 Six of these investigations are still ongoing;
of the sixty-one investigations that have been resolved, twenty-nine
have resulted in binding agreements overseen by monitors, eight have
resulted in agreements by jurisdictions to reform without oversight,
and twenty-four have resulted in other resolutions including, in some
instances, a series of recommendations without a court mandate but
with the potential for further investigation and litigation. 24 In the
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994).
23
Kimbriell Kelly et al., Forced Reforms, Mixed Results, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2015),
[https://
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/11/13/forced-reforms-mixed-results/
perma.cc /9HQE-NVXZ].
24
See id. (reporting that nine investigations remained open at the time the article was
published). Note, however, that the DOJ has since resolved its police practices investigations of
Miami, Florida; Ferguson, Missouri; and Newark, New Jersey. All three involve oversight by
monitors. For information about the agreements in these and other cases, see generally Special
Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https:I/www.justice.gov/crt /speciallitigation-section-cases-and-mattersO#police [https://perma.cc /4B8K-RCX4).
22
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consent decrees and settlements it has entered into with law
enforcement agencies, the DOJ has negotiated for a consistent set of
policies that require better collection of data, improved assessment of
problem officers, and improved civilian complaint procedures. 25
Leverage. The strength of the DOJ's statutory authority to
investigate and sue law enforcement agencies lies in its leverage to
demand that reforms occur. 26 That leverage is aimed at the leadership
of those law enforcement agencies and the leadership of the cities and
counties in which those agencies are located. For those agencies that
the DOJ investigates, its leverage is the threat that the DOJ will sue if
the agency does not voluntarily improve or agree to enter into an
enforceable agreement. When the DOJ has sued law enforcement
agencies, it has only lost once-all other cases have resulted in a
consent decree. 27 The Department's leverage post-consent decree is the
threat of continued judicial oversight and, perhaps, being held in
contempt by the court overseeing that consent decree. However, that
leverage only lasts so long as a court has jurisdiction over the case and
court monitors to review the department's practices. 28
Motivation. The motivation of the DOJ to investigate and prosecute
law enforcement agencies currently seems quite strong, but depends in
no small part on the priorities of the President in office. In 2009, just as
25 For descriptions of the core reforms mandated by
the DOJ, see Rachel A. Harmon,
Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2009);
Samuel Walker, The New Paradigmof Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department "Pattern*
or Practice"Suits in Context, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 7-9 (2003).
26 See Katherine Skiba & Anne Sweeney, Historic Probe of Chicago
Police Expected to Be
Long and Costly, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 12, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ctchicago-police-civil-rights-probe-met-20 151212-story.html
[https: //perma.cc /6MGQ-TEJL]
(quoting Stephen Rushin, who has studied the DOJ investigations, as saying, "The No. 1 good
thing about these federal interventions is they force local municipalities to face the issue of police
misconduct head-on... . [here's a bunch of structural and organizational reasons, without

federal interventions, that make it easy for cities to push those difficult decisions off their plate.").

"

John Swaine & Ciara McCarthy, Department of Justice Sues City of Ferguson to Force

Criminal
Justice
Reforms,
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
10,
2016,
5:22
PM
EST),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/10/ferguson-department-of-justice-lawsuit-police-

reforms [https://perma.cc /6F9A-GYFX]. The DOJ is currently appealing its one loss at trial. Id.
28 Scholars, journalists, and the DOJ itself have been measuring
the effects of DOJ consent
decrees during and after court supervision. For studies examining the effects of DOJ
investigations, see Sarah Childress, Inside 20 Years of Federal Police Probes, FRONTLINE (Dec. 14,
2015), http: //www.pbs.org /wgbh/frontline/article/inside-20-years-of-federal-police-probes/ [https: //
perma.cc /Q9TY-E9QG] (finding that, after reaching out to all agencies investigated by the DOJ,
"Most of those who entered into agreements to reform, and even a few who didn't, said the process
had improved the department in terms of training, equipment and best practices."); CHRISTOPHER
STONE ET AL., POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICs OF CHANGE AT

THE LAPD (2009), http://assets.lapdonline.org /assets/pdflHarvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf [http://
perma.cc /8PEC-UKZ8] (examining changes to the Los Angeles Police Department following its
consent decree with the DOJ); cf. Kelly et al., supra note 23 (describing difficulties in measuring
impact of DOJ interventions).
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Barack Obama assumed the presidency from George W. Bush, the
consensus was that, "hampered by limited resources and inadequate
political commitment, the Justice Department has brought too few
cases." 29 During President Obama's tenure, the DOJ much more
aggressively used its power to take legal action against law
enforcement. 30
Resources. It is the DOJ's resources that are most often criticized
as inadequate to the task of reforming law enforcement agencies. The
DOJ appears to have sufficient resources on a micro level-in other
words, it has the resources to conduct the investigations it undertakes.
Yet, on a macro level, the DOJ does not have the resources to mount
investigations for more than a small sliver of the approximately 18,000
law enforcement agencies across the country. 31 Each investigation can
take thousands of hours of attorney time over several years, and
currently there are only eighteen attorneys in the DOJ's Civil Rights
Division that investigate the practices of law enforcement agencies full
time. 32 The Obama administration recently asked Congress for an
additional $2.5 million for the unit that investigates law enforcement
agencies, reporting that current investigations plus "increased demand
for action on police misconduct" has "outstripped the Division's
available resources." 33 But a few million dollars may not solve the
DOJ's resource problem. As Rachel Harmon has observed, "If any
significant number of the nation's large police departments are
structurally deficient, the Justice Department is unlikely-under the
Obama Administration or any other-to have sufficient resources to
investigate and sue every problematic police department." 34

Harmon, supra note 25, at 2.
30
See Kelly et al., supra note 23 (describing the uptick in DOJ investigations since Barack
Obama took office).
31 See Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189,
3230 (2014) (estimating that the DOJ can investigate fewer than 0.02% of the nation's law
enforcement agencies each year).
3' See Ryan J. Reilly, Chicago Case Could Overwhelm Tiny DOJ Unit That Investigates Police
Civil Rights Abuses, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2015, 5:26 PM EST), http://www.huffingtonpost.
[http: //perma.cc /VN69-J78Z].
comlentry/chicago-justice-department_5665a85ee4b08e945ff005d9
Note that other divisions of the DOJ investigate criminal civil rights violations by individual
officers, and discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, and disability.
29

See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ADDRESSING POLICE MISCONDUCT LAWS ENFORCED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http: //www.justice.gov/crt /addressing-police-misconduct-laws-enforced-

department-justice [https:lperma.cc 17NM7-YPPZ].
3 Id.
*' Harmon, supranote 25, at 3-4.
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2. Public entity liability insurers.
The vast majority of law enforcement agencies in the country are
small and many rely on insurance through public entity risk pools or
private insurers.3 5 In prior research I have found that these insurers
take a number of steps to reduce their insured's liability exposure:
Insurers examine trends in past claims and notify their members of
those trends, develop model policies, and offer trainings to their
members. 36
Leverage. Insurers have significant leverage over the law
enforcement agencies they insure-the threat that they will raise
premiums or withdraw coverage for law enforcement agencies that
become too risky to insure. When agencies are sued multiple times,
insurers sometimes threaten to limit or deny coverage unless the
department makes a specific policy or personnel change.37 Agencies
that have failed to follow insurers' recommendations have lost their
insurance coverage and ceased to exist. 38
Motivation. Municipal insurers should have strong motivations to
reduce liability exposure through claims review, policy development,
and training-it is, after all, critical to their bottom line to do so.
Presumably, insurers are only motivated to pressure police to adopt the
types of reforms that will decrease their liability exposure. Insurers
likely have less motivation to prevent misconduct that does not result
in costly injuries-victims of these types of violations are unlikely to
find lawyers to represent them and are unlikely to recover significant
damages if they do sue. 39 But insurers should have strong motivations
to pursue policing reforms that can lead to reductions in liability costs.
Resources. Like the DOJ, public entity liability insurers appear to
have enough resources, at a micro level, to review claims and engage in

' For the frequency with which smaller jurisdictions rely on liability insurance, see Joanna
C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV.
1144, 1170 (2016); John Rappaport, How Private Insurance Regulates Public Police, 130 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017).
6 See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1189; see also John Rappaport, An Insurance-Based
Typology of Police Misconduct, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 369, 377-78 ("[I]nsurers use a variety of
tools to tame in police violence .... [S]ome even engage in classroom instruction."); Rappaport,
supra note 35.
37 See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1189.
3 Id.
3
See infra notes 47-49, and accompanying text (describing how interpretation of fee-shifting
doctrines discourages plaintiffs' attorneys from representing plaintiffs with limited damages). For
further discussion of public entity liability insurers' limited motivation to prevent 'low-dollar"
harms, and limited ability to predict or prevent 'long-tail" harms, see Rappaport, supra note 36, at
399.
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risk management. 40 Public entity liability insurers can price insurance
premiums at a level that allows them to engage in these reform efforts.
But, like the DOJ, public entity liability insurers can only reach a
limited number of law enforcement agencies and therefore have
resource limitations at a macro level. While the DOJ's resources are
limited by their budgetary allocation from Congress, insurers' resources
are limited by the market for their product: they can only influence
those law enforcement agencies that purchase insurance. 41 How big a
resource problem this is depends on how one looks at it. The vast
majority of law enforcement agencies are small and rely on insurance.
On the other hand, the vast majority of officers-and, presumably, the
vast majority of lawsuits-are in self-insured jurisdictions. 42
Reformers with Strong Motivations but Limited Leverage

B.

Here, I consider three types of reformers-civil plaintiffs, criminal
defendants, and non-governmental actors (including advocacy groups
and the press)-each of which has strong motivations to engage in
police reform efforts but limited leverage over law enforcement
agencies.
1. Civil plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs whose rights have been violated can sue law enforcement
officers and departments. The Supreme Court's standing doctrine
makes it difficult for a plaintiff to bring claims for injunctive relief
against law enforcement; accordingly, plaintiffs rely primarily on
damages actions. 43 Civil damages actions are assumed not only to
See Rappaport, supra note 36, at 369.
One could also look at this as a leverage problem; insurers have lots of leverage over
agencies that purchase insurance but no leverage over agencies that are self-insured. Because my
definition of macro-level resources concerns the ability of a reformer to pursue their efforts across
a broad number of agencies, I have framed this limitation as one of resources.
42
See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1160.
4
See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-05 (1983) (finding no standing to seek
injunctive relief because there was not a "real and immediate" threat of future injury). Despite the
limitations announced in Lyons, several successful civil suits have sought injunctive relief to
address stop-and-frisk practices, racial disparities in traffic stops, and systemic police abuses. See,
e.g., John M. Glionna, Oakland Pays for Police Abuse, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2003), http://
(describing
[http://perma.cc [DD8V-E2FT]
articles.latimes.com/2003/feb/20/locallme-oakland20
settlement of class action against the Oakland Police Department, which included payment of
$10.9 million and systemic reform of the department); Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York
Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/
stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html [https://perma.cc /8BTK-LTS9] (describing
the Floyd class action challenging stop-and-frisk practices in New York City). These types of civil
suits seeking injunctive relief function much like the DOJ's interventions, forcing policy changes
with the leverage of judicial oversight.
4o
41
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compensate plaintiffs for their injuries, but also to deter future
misconduct. 44 Commentators have observed that press coverage of suits
can create political pressures to reform.4 5 And payouts are expected to
make individual officers and departments change their behavior to
avoid being sued again. 46
Motivation. Plaintiffs and their attorneys may be motivated by any
number of interests-to punish individual defendants, to reform law
enforcement, to have their day in court, or to get paid. Regardless of the
nature of plaintiffs' motivations, those motivations are likely to be
strongly held. In order for a civil case to be filed, a plaintiff must be
motivated enough to seek out an attorney or file a complaint on her
own. Assuming that the plaintiff's attorney has taken the case on
contingency, the attorney's motivations will be equally strong-she is,
after all, investing her time and money in a case for which she will
recover nothing unless the plaintiff prevails. Assuming the attorney is
taking seriously her responsibility to zealously advocate on behalf of
her client, she will have strong motivations to prevail regardless of how
she is being paid.
Resources. On a micro level, whether an individual plaintiff has
sufficient resources to litigate her claims will likely depend on whether
a lawyer will agree to take her case. Plaintiffs, generally speaking, do
not have the resources necessary to finance a suit against law
enforcement. Congress addressed this resource issue in 1976 by passing
a fee-shifting statute to allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover reasonable
attorney's fees from government defendants. 47 Yet various limitations.
on fee-shifting awards mean that plaintiffs' attorneys cannot rely on
the promise of fee shifting, even for a case that is strong on the
merits. 48 As a result, attorneys are most likely to bring cases on behalf
of plaintiffs who have suffered significant monetary damages (such that
44
See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 727 (1999)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Section 1983] is designed to provide compensation for injuries arising
from the violation of legal duties, and thereby, of course, to deter future violations." (citation
omitted)); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) ("[T]he damages a plaintiff recovers
contributes significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations in the future."); Memphis Cmty.
Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) ("Deterrence ... operates through the mechanism
of damages that are compensatory" (emphasis omitted)).
4
See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 861 (2001).
1 For illustrations of the Supreme Court's reliance on these assumptions, see Joanna C.
Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 892-98, 955 (2014).
4
For a history of Section 1988, the fee-shifting statute, see Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for
Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POLY 1 (2003).
48
See id. at 19-21 (describing limitations on Section 1988 and explaining that these
limitations discourage attorneys from accepting cases with strong proof of liability but low
damages).
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the attorney could be adequately paid through a contingency
arrangement if fee shifting is unavailable), or on behalf of a class of
plaintiffs who have suffered less costly injuries (assuming they can
satisfy class certification requirements). Attorneys aiming to recover a
fee are unlikely to agree to represent an individual plaintiff who has
49
suffered minimal damages, even if proof of liability is strong.
Plaintiffs in such cases can proceed pro se, but are unlikely to have the
financial resources or expertise to litigate their claims effectively.
On a macro level, whether there are enough attorneys to represent
plaintiffs in civil suits against the police likely depends on where those
plaintiffs live. In a prior study, I observed that a person mistreated by
the police in El Paso, Texas, is far less likely to find an attorney to
represent him than a person mistreated by the police in New York
City.5 0 This is so not only because there are fewer attorneys bringing
these types of cases in El Paso, but also because regional variations in
judges' application of qualified immunity and other doctrines, city
attorney practices, and community norms likely influence how cases
are valued and, thus, whether an attorney will be inclined to take a
case on contingency. 51
Leverage. Civil rights damages actions likely suffer most for lack of
leverage. Lawsuits can create indirect pressures to reform, especially if
52
the case involves compelling facts reported on in the press. And suits
that announce new legal rules can impact police trainings and
management. 53 But, for a host of reasons, individual officers and police
Attorneys representing their clients pro bono will be less constrained by this financial
49
calculation, but even attorneys taking cases pro bono may seek to recover attorneys' fees if they
prevail.
5
Schwartz, supra note 46, at 917 n.137.

5'

Id. at 917.

See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 45, at 858-67 (describing the "informational" and "fault-fixing"
functions of constitutional damages actions); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1555, 1681 (2003) (describing how negative publicity regarding lawsuits "can trigger
embarrassing political inquiry and even firings, resignations, or election losses."). I have argued
that law enforcement agencies could also learn a great deal about their officers' conduct by
reviewing information in lawsuits, but have found that few law enforcement agencies do so. See
Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055, 1081-83
52

(2015); see also SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT

100-01 (2001) ("One of the notable failures of both police departments and other city officials has
been their neglect of modern concepts of risk management and in particular their refusal to
examine incidents that result in litigation and seek to correct the underlying problems.").
m For example, a decision by the California Supreme Court that "tactical conduct and
decisions preceding the use of deadly force are relevant considerations under California law in
determining whether the use of deadly force gives rise to negligence liability" caused the Los
Angeles Police Commission to change the ways in which it evaluates whether force used by its
officers was proper. See Patrick Healy, LAPD Commission Adds to Guidelines for Review of Police
Use of Force, NBC L.A. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/LAPD4
Commission-Adds-to-Guidelines-for-Review-of-Police-Use-of-Force-24609 15 1.html
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departments have little to fear with regard to damages actions. People
who believe they have been mistreated by the police rarely sue. 54
Restrictive interpretations of constitutional principles limit the number
of people who can prove violations by law enforcement.5 5 Qualified
immunity protects individual officers from liability for federal
constitutional violations unless they are "plainly incompetent" or
"knowingly violate the law."5 6 And complex and taxing municipal
liability standards make it exceedingly difficult to prevail against a city
or county on a claim.57
Even when civil rights plaintiffs prevail in damages actions, that
success may not create leverage over the involved law enforcement
officers and agencies. In prior research, I found that law enforcement
agencies rarely collect or analyze information about the litigation
history of their officers, that suits rarely have negative ramifications
for officers' employment, and that officers are virtually always
indemnified.5 8 Successful lawsuits may have negative political
consequences for law enforcement agencies-the city council or mayor
may use a large payout to pressure agency officials to improve. It is
difficult to measure the power of these political pressures. But it is
clear that these political pressures rarely translate into financial
pressures; municipal budgeting practices usually insulate police

[http://perma.cc /HP5K-SDVX] (quoting Hayes v. County of San Diego, 305 P.3d 252, 639 (Cal.
2013)). Note, however, that current qualified immunity doctrine-which allows courts to dismiss

cases without deciding whether a constitutional right was violated-presumably makes it less
likely for courts to announce new federal constitutional standards in civil cases. See Karen M.

Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.,
913, 927 (2015).
54

See Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDoZO L. REV. 841, 863

(2012) (citing evidence suggesting that people who believe they have been harmed by the police
sue only approximately one percent of the time and offering possible explanations for the low filing
rate).
"

For discussions of the Supreme Court's use of force doctrine, see Rachel A. Harmon, When

is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1119, 1125-40 (2008). For discussions of the
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine as it relates to stop-and-frisk practices, see Devon

W. Carbado, Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Racial Profiling Lives On, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/opinion/racial-profiling-lives-on.html
[https://perma.cc/6AQ5-NP4A]; cf. Leong, supra note 12, at 427 (finding, based on a study of
appellate Fourth Amendment decisions, that civil plaintiffs prevailed almost half the time
whereas criminal defendants prevailed just ten percent of the time).
6 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
5 See generally David J. Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: MunicipalLiability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183 (2005)
(describing the difficulty of establishing municipal liability).
5 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law
Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1076-77 (2010); Schwartz, supra note 46, at
936-37.
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department budgets from feeling any financial consequences of lawsuit
payouts. 59
2. Criminal defendants.
When officers involved in an investigation or arrest violate the
Constitution-by failing to give Miranda warnings, or by seizing
evidence without a valid warrant or probable cause-criminal
defendants and their attorneys can seek to have statements or evidence
excluded from trial. A primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter officers from violating the law in future investigations and
arrests. 60
Motivation. Defendants are highly motivated to suppress evidence
when they can; doing so will, presumably, increase a defendant's
chances of winning at trial or negotiating an attractive plea deal.
Defense counsel zealously advocating on behalf of their clients share
in
those motivations, although there are stories-particularly
jurisdictions without public defender offices, in which judges appoint
attorneys to represent indigent defendants-of defense counsel whose
primary goal is "to curry favor with the judge by getting a quick guilty
plea from the client." 6 1
Resources. At a micro level, criminal defendants and their
attorneys are notoriously resource-constrained; attorneys in many
public defender offices must represent hundreds of clients at a time
without resources to adequately investigate their clients' cases and
mount their strongest defenses. 62 These resource limitations likely
mean that some meritorious suppression motions are never made and
that others are made ineffectively. Yet, on a macro level, criminal
defendants are well resourced compared to other types of police
reformers-almost everyone charged with a felony and approximately
two-thirds of people charged with misdemeanors are represented by
counsel, either hired or appointed. 63 No other police reformer-with the

See generally Schwartz, supra note 35.
* See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Right, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 357, 357 (2012) (summarizing the Supreme Court's reliance on a
deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule).
61 Stephen B. Bright, Turning Celebrated Principlesinto Reality, CHAMPION, Feb. 2003, at 6, 7
(quoting "an experienced criminal defense lawyer in Houston").
5

6
See generally ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (Dec. 2004),
AMERICA'S CONTINUING
BROKEN PROMISE:

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal aid-indigent -defendants/1s-sc
[http://perma.ccfF2F9laid-def bpjrighttocounsel-incriminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
EDRV]; supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing public defenders' limited resources).
Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases, BUREAU OF JUST.
63 See Caroline Wolf Harlow,
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exception of criminal prosecutors-are as plentiful. And with counsel,
even overburdened counsel, comes some success: Best estimates are
that 300,000 criminal cases are dismissed each year as a result of
Fourth Amendment violations. 64 In contrast, my prior research
suggests that plaintiffs recover money in fewer than 8000 civil damages
actions alleging police misconduct each year. 65
Leverage. The exclusionary rule gives criminal defendants and
their attorneys limited leverage over law enforcement.
The
exclusionary rule does nothing to prevent unconstitutional conduct in
the vast majority of police interactions that do not result in seizures of
evidence or arrests. 6 6 And the exclusionary rule's many exceptions and
limitations mean that searches and seizures will often be found in
conformance with the Constitution. 67
When a court does suppress evidence, this decision can create
leverage in one of two ways. First, if a court announces a new
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in its ruling, law enforcement
agencies may change their trainings to comply with the ruling. 6 8

STATISTICS

(2000)

at

1,

http:I/www.bjs.gov/content /pub/pdf/dcc.pdf

[https://perma.ce /77Q7-

RDJNJ.
6
65

See Sklansky, supra note 2, at 580.
In my police indemnification study, which included law enforcement agencies that

employed approximately twenty percent of the law enforcement officers across the country, I found

9225 police misconduct cases over a six-year period in which plaintiffs recovered money. See
Schwartz, supra note 46. Based on these figures, jurisdictions employing all officers across the
country pay plaintiffs to resolve approximately 7687 police misconduct cases each year.
6
See Harmon, supra note 17, at 39 ("[E]xcluding evidence cannot influence officers or
departments uninterested in using illegally obtained evidence in a criminal prosecution, and it

cannot discourage unconstitutional conduct that is unlikely to produce evidence."); Sklansky,
supra note 2, at 581-82 ("[R]ecent empirical work on street-level policing underscores not only
that the exclusionary rule is largely powerless in cases the police do not expect to take before a

judge, but also that this category constitutes the majority of the cases in which the police
operate."); Walker, supra note 2, at 18 ("[M]ost police activities remain uncovered by any Court

decision. If an illegal search does not result in prosecution and conviction, for example, there is no
grounds for an appeal under Mapp.").
6
See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 25, at 10 ("[T]he [exclusionary] rule is riddled with exceptions
and limitations, many of which are inconsistent with using the exclusionary rule as an effective
deterrent of police misconduct"); Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1885, 1887-88 (2014) (describing recent Supreme Court decisions as "establish[ing] the
doctrinal basis for radically curtailing the circumstances in which the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule might apply.").
' See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in GrudgingDefense of the Exclusionary Rule,
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525, 543 (2013) ("After the Court prohibited random stops of motorists to
check their licenses and registration in Delaware v. Prouse, the District of Columbia Police
Department almost immediately overhauled its policies to comply with the new ruling. More
recently, after the Court held that the installation and subsequent use of a GPS device to monitor
a vehicle's movements was a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in United
States v. Jones, the FBI's general counsel reported that the decision caused the agency to turn off
nearly 3,000 monitoring devices."); Sklansky, supra note 2 (observing that California law
enforcement agencies stopped training their officers not to conduct warrantless searches of trash,
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Second, when a court decides to suppress evidence but does not
announce a new legal rule, that decision may impact the individual
officer whose conduct is found to be unconstitutional. The consequences
of that ruling for the involved officer depend, however, on the
recordkeeping practices of the police department and prosecutor.
In some jurisdictions, prosecutors keep track of courts' decisions to
suppress evidence or dismiss cases as a result of officers' dishonesty or
unconstitutional behavior; prosecutors who keep these so-called Brady
lists may resist working with such officers because evidence of their
69
past misdeeds will have to be turned over to defense counsel. In these
jurisdictions, the threat of a suppression decision may pressure officers
not to behave dishonestly or unconstitutionally, and a finding of
dishonesty or unconstitutional behavior may cause department officials
to take action against the misbehaving officer. In other jurisdictions,
however, prosecutors do not keep track of suppression decisions and do
not inform individual law enforcement officers and agencies when
courts suppress evidence or dismiss cases as a result of officers'
unconstitutional behavior. 70 In these jurisdictions, suppression
decisions will likely have less impact on officer and agency practices.
3. Non-Governmental actors.
A wide range of non-governmental groups advocate for police
reforms and protest when police abuses occur, including the ACLU,
NAACP, Black Lives Matter, local non-profits, church groups, and
unions.7 1 There are also a number of reporters who cover policing issues
for newspapers, television, radio, and Internet news sites, and

a requirement of California constitutional law, after the United States Supreme Court rejected
this prohibition); Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1121 (2001) (examining how California law enforcement agencies trained officers to comply with a
Supreme Court decision).
6 See, e.g., Christian McPhate, Local Brady List Exists: District Attorney's Office Says It
Keeps Track of County Officers' Conduct, DENTON RECORD-CHRONICLE (July 2, 2015),
http: //www.dentonrc.com/1ocal-news/local-news-headlines/20150702-local-brady-list-exists.ece
[https:lperma.cc /2U3E-WKF4]; Tony Shin, DA Keeps "Dishonest Cops" List, NBC7 SAN DIEGO
(May 18, 2011, 6:56 AM PDT) http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Exclusive-DA-Has-SecretList-Of-Law-Enforcement-Officers- 122114294.html [https: /perma.cc /6DKR-QM3L].
70 See Schwartz, supra note 58, at 1079-80 (describing studies); see also Kathyrn Haake,
Missoula Prosecutors:No Official 'Brady Cop'List; Officer with Label Still Employed, MISSOULIAN
(Apr. 25, 2015), http: /missoulian.com/news/locallmissoula-prosecutors-no-official-brady-cop-list[https:lperma.cc IVM4Eofficer-with-label/article_5d3a6d57-95d6-572d-a5fc-Ob24a8all6ec.html
AMAE].
71
See, e.g., Michael Dresser & Luke Broadwater, NAACP, ACLU, Other Groups Call for
in Maryland, BALT. SUN (July 23, 2015, 7:21 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.
Reform
Police
com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-police-panel-20150723-story.html [http://perma.cc l49E7
-4M42] (describing a variety of advocacy groups' efforts in Baltimore).
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document both individual instances of misconduct and systemic
failures. 72 It is more difficult to characterize the motivation, resources,
and leverage of this motley crew of non-governmental actors. Yet they
are included in this discussion because they play an important role in
police reform efforts.
Motivation. Only those reporters and non-governmental groups
engaged in police reform efforts should be understood to be police
reformers; unlike the other entities I have described, this is a selfselecting group. As a result, the non-governmental actors engaged in
police reform efforts generally have strong motivations to do their work.
Some groups and reporters may have other responsibilities or interests
that take time away from their police reform efforts. But those engaged
in police reform efforts do not, generally speaking, have priorities or
responsibilities that conflict with their motivations to pursue police
reforms.
Resources. Non-governmental groups engaged in police reform
efforts have widely varying amounts of resources; an organization like
the ACLU has far more resources than does a local non-profit
organization, and a reporter at The New York Times has far more
resources than a blogger on Huffington Post. The costs of their
activities also vary; a full-page advertisement in a newspaper will cost
far more than a Twitter campaign, and it will cost far more to send a
network news reporter to investigate a troubled department than it will
cost a local reporter to share her observations of that same department.
There is not, however, a direct correlation between the amount of
resources a reporter or group has and the impact of their efforts. Efforts
by The Guardian and The Washington Post to collect data on the
number of people killed by the police in 2015 took far more resources
than it took organizers to begin using the Black Lives Matter hashtag,
yet both efforts have been extremely influential. 73 With so much
variation in the amount of resources possessed by different nongovernmental actors, and so much variation in the amount of resources
needed by these actors to engage in reform efforts, it is hard to draw
any overarching conclusions in this area. It seems, though, that non-

72

See, e.g., Jeremy Borden, How a Little Known, Uber-Driving Freelancer
Brought the

Lawsuit that Forced Chicago to Release a Police Shooting Video, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,

Nov. 25, 2015.
1
See Jannell Ross, How Black Lives Matter Moved from a Hashtag to a Real PoliticalForce,
WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/08/19/howblack-lives-matter-moved-from-a-hashtag-to-a-real-political-force/
[https://perma.cclPZL6-SEYW]
(observing that Black Lives Matter, which began as a hashtag, has become what The New York
Times has called "the 21" Century's first civil rights movement"); infra Part TV.B.1 (describing the
effects of reporting by The Guardianand The Washington Post).
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governmental actors engaged in police reform efforts can generally find
ways to make productive use of the resources they have.
strong
groups possess
non-governmental
Leverage. While
Unlike
motivations, they have no direct leverage over law enforcement.
elected officials, these groups cannot pass laws requiring law
enforcement agencies to change. And unlike criminal defendants, civil
plaintiffs, and criminal prosecutors, these groups cannot officially
sanction individual officers for violating the law. Yet these nongovernmental groups do have the ability to raise awareness about
instances of police misconduct and systemic problems and can, as a
74
result, increase the motivations of elected officials to advance reforms.
C.

Reformers with Lots of Leverage but Mixed Motivations

Here I consider two types of police reformers-criminal prosecutors
and elected officials-that have significant leverage over law
enforcement but may not be motivated to pursue police reforms.
1. Criminal prosecutors.
Criminal prosecutors should be understood as police reformers.
Prosecutions for criminal conduct should deter or incapacitate
offending officers, and the threat of prosecution should have a more
75
general deterrent effect.
Leverage. The threat of prosecution should create significant
leverage-deterrence theory, at least, imagines that the threat of being
76
arrested and going to prison could influence officer behavior. Yet, for
several reasons, prosecutions and convictions are rare: Many states
have very high standards for criminal conviction, prosecutors
infrequently bring criminal charges against the police, and juries'
proven sympathies for law enforcement make convictions difficult to
74 See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, How Much Do Black Lives Matter to the Presidential
Campaign?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/opinion/campaignstops/how-much-do-black-lives-matter-to-the-presidential-campaign.html?_r=O
[https: //perma.cc /J9QF-F2HG] ("The onslaught of confrontations between blacks and the police, as
well as intense coverage on TV and online of college campus protests and of the Black Lives
Matter movement, have decisively affected the Democratic Party's position on a core issue: the use
of force to maintain public order."); infra Part 1V.B.1 (describing how newspapers' tallies of people
killed by the police in 2015 prompted the federal government to improve its data collection efforts).
' My focus here is on prosecutors' ability to bring criminal charges against law enforcement
officers, although prosecutors can also play a role in reforms if they keep so-called Brady lists of
officers whose credibility has been damaged. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing
Brady lists and their effects).
76 Walker, supra note 2, at 19 (observing that criminal prosecutions of police officers is a
"reform strategy ... based on the expectation that successful conviction will both remove bad
officers from the police department and deter future misconduct by other officers.").
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win.7 7 The unlikelihood of prosecution and criminal conviction may
mute prosecutors' leverage to some degree, although the threat of
prosecution-even if remote-might still impact officers' behavior. And
when a prosecutor does, in fact, prosecute an officer, that prosecution
likely carries a great deal of leverage with that officer and his
colleagues.
Resources. Criminal prosecutors appear to feel some resource
constraints on a micro level. Reduced state and federal budgets have
recently required prosecutors' offices to reduce the number of attorneys,
investigators, and paralegals they have on staff. 8 But available
evidence suggests that prosecutors' offices have more resources than
their most frequent adversaries; in 2007, "total spending by state
prosecutors offices nationwide exceeded that of public defender offices
by nearly $3.5 billion." 79
Like criminal defendants, criminal prosecutors are well resourced
on a macro level. There are more than 2300 state prosecutors' offices
across the country and these offices employ approximately 78,000
attorneys, investigators, paralegals, and support staff.80

7
See, e.g., Shaila Dewan & Timothy Williams, More Police Officers Facing Charges, But Few
See Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/30/us/more-police-officersfacing-charges-but-few-see-jail.html [https://perma.cc /FKP2-SNLB] (reporting an expert's view

that "[e]ven with indictments, juries will remain reluctant to convict police officers absent evidence

of malice"); David Packman, The Problem with Prosecuting Police in Washington State, CATO
INSTITUTE (Feb. 27, 2011, 12:55 AM), http:lwww.policemisconduct.net /the-problem withprosecuting-police-in-washington-state/ [http://perma.cc /ZTG4-3LCQ]. Packman's article describes
research from the Cato Institute's National Police Misconduct Statistics and Reporting Project,

which found 3238 criminal prosecutions and 1063 convictions over a twenty-one month period. The
study found that law enforcement has lower conviction and incarceration rates, and shorter
sentences, than civilians charged with similar crimes. Id. Law enforcement seem especially

unlikely to be criminally charged in cases involving excessive force. Criminal prosecutions for
police killings rose in 2015 but remain extremely rare. See Henry Gass, Police FacingProsecution
More Often,
but It's Still Rare, CHRISTIAN
SC.
MONITOR
(Oct.
28,
2015),
http: //www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/20 15/1028/Police-facing-prosecution-more-often-but-it-s-

still-rare [http://perma.cc /D7FC-Y5AP]. For a description of legal standards that make it
challenging to win a conviction of a police officer, see Monu Bedi, Towards a Uniform Code of
Police Justice, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 24-28 ("[S]tates continue to treat officers differently,
although end up doing so in a partial and inconsistent way. . . . These unique features may help

explain why oppression charged are rarely brought against police officers.").
" See Michelle Tuccitto Sullo, State Prosecutors Says Budget Cuts Could Mean 50 Layoffs,
CONN. LAW TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/id=1202749666727/StateProsecutors-Says-Budget-Cuts-Could-Mean-50-Layoffs?mcode=O&curindex=o
[https://perma.cc/
Z9EC-4JBR].
7

Levintova, supra note 18.

Steven W. Perry & Duren Banks, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2007-Statistical Tables,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content /pub/pdf/pscO7st.pdf
8

[https://perma.cc /98M7-773Q]; Sam Wright, This Time It's Prosecutors on the Chopping Block,
ABOVE THE LAw (June 2, 2015, 3:00 PM), http:I/abovethelaw.com/2015/06/this-time-itsprosecutors-on-the-chopping-block/ [https: //perma.cc /N4VJ-34SS].
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Motivation. Prosecutors' greatest limitation as reformers likely lies
with their motivations. As many have observed, local prosecutors
reliant on police officers to help investigate and prosecute their other
81
cases may be wary of bringing criminal charges against officers. As an
appellate public defender explains:
Prosecutors and police officers who work in the same jurisdiction
are part of the same team . . . and their allegiances reflect that.
Prosecutors rely on local police officers to make arrests,
investigate cases, interrogate suspects and testify at trial. Police
officers, in turn, rely on prosecutors to convert their arrests into
convictions and assist with investigations. It's bizarre to expect
82
a full-throttle prosecution of one teammate by the other.
Commentators have argued that this wariness reveals itself at
multiple stages of the criminal process: the decision to charge; the type
of evidence and argument presented before the grand jury; and the
presentation at trial. 83

' See Michele L. Jawando & Chelsea Parsons, 4 Ideas That Could Begin to Reform the
CriminalJustice System and Improve Police-Community Relations, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec.

https: //www.americanprogress.org /issues/civil-liberties/report /2014/12/18/103578/418, 2014)
ideas-that-could-begin-to-reform-the-criminal-justice-system-and-improve-police-communityrelations/ [http://perma.cc /8MDF-9QJN] ("The perception, real or perceived, is that local
prosecutors have far too great of an interest to protect and justify the actions of local law
enforcement."); Blacks in Law Enforcement in America, Why It's Almost Impossible to Reform
America's Police (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.bleausa.org /why-its-almost-impossible-to-reformamericas-police! [http://perma.cc /GD7K-ZU69] ("[P]rosecutors are not incentivized to doubt every
story of the cops they work with daily. In addition to working together on criminal cases, many
state and local prosecutors are elected officials who rely on political support from police. And
prosecutors often run on their conviction stats, further disincentivizing them from questioning the
people who supply the cases that keep them in office.").
82
Joshua Deahl, Police Killings Call for New Kind of Prosecutor, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Dec. 4,
2014, 4:55 PM EST), http: /www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014- 12-04/police-killings-call-fornew-kind-of-prosecutor [http:Ilperma.cc /XY2G-YBYJ].
For criticisms of the Chicago prosecutor's decision to wait over a year before bringing
8
charges against the Chicago Police Department officer who shot Laquan McDonald, see Leon
Neyfakh, Why Did It Take More than a Year to Charge the Officer Who Shot Laquan McDonald,
SLATE (Nov. 25, 2015, 4:41 PM) http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/crime/2015/11/
laquan-mcdonaldtkimjfoxx-on-why-anita-alvarez-mishandled thejason-van-dyke.html [http://
perma.ce /68BB-UPKB]. For criticisms of the prosecutor's grand jury strategy regarding Darren
Wilson, who killed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, see David Zucchino, Prosecutor's Grand
Jury Strategy in Ferguson Case Adds to Controversy, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014, 8:49 PM),
2
http: /www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ferguson-da-analysis- 0141126-story.html [http://perma.cc/
H5RF-JC5R]. For criticisms of the prosecutor's presentation to the grand jury considering charges
against officers involved in the death of Tamir Rice, see Ari Melber, The Tamir Rice Case Shows
How Prosecutors Twist Grand Juries to Protect Police, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2015),
https: /www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything /wp/2015/12/29/in-tamir-rices-case-the-grandjury-process-was-turned-upside-down/ [http//perma.cc /BHF4-VLCA]; Jamil Smith, The Tamir
Rice Rule, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 29, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/126737/tamir-rice-rule
[http://perma.cc /D7ZD-XGDT]. For criticisms of the Los Angeles County district attorney's office,
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2. Elected officials.
Elected officials at the federal, state, and local levels-including
mayors, legislatures, governors, city councils, and the President-can
pass laws that regulate police behavior. The federal government has
recently changed rules regarding the distribution of military equipment
to law enforcement agencies and has taken steps to improve federal
collection of force data. 84 State and local governments have passed laws
mandating the use of police body cameras, requiring data collection
about force, establishing independent review of officer-involved deaths,
banning chokeholds, and creating databases with information about
officers who have been fired.85 Legislators can also hold hearings about
police practices.8 6
Leverage. Elected officials can pass legislation or enact orders
requiring law enforcement agencies to implement reforms. This power
presumably creates significant leverage over law enforcement to change
their behavior to conform to those laws and orders. However, this
leverage is not absolute-some law enforcement agencies refuse to
enforce legislation and others may quietly fail to comply. 87 Government
which has declined to bring charges against Sheriff's Department deputies later prosecuted by the
United States Attorney, see Joel Rubin, Feds Exposed Jail Abuse that D.A.'s Office Failed to Find,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2015, at Al.
84 See, e.g., Gregory Korte, Obama Bans Some Military Equipment Sales to Police, USA
TODAY (May 18, 2015, 5:04 PM EDT), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/05/18/
obama-police-military-equipment-sales-new-jersey/2752 1793/ [http://perma.cc /LQY7-GE56]; infra
Part IV.B. 1 (describing federal initiatives to improve federal data collection about police killings).
8
For discussions of particular laws, see, for example, Kim Geiger & Jeremy Gorner, Rauner
Signs Police Body Camera Bill into Law, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2015, 6:06 PM),
http: /www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-bruce-rauner-police-body-camera-bill-met0713-20150812-story.html [http://perma.cc /V9YJ-HZVX] (describing Illinois state law requiring
departments with body cameras follow specific policies expanding training, banning chokeholds,
requiring independent investigation of officer-involved deaths, and creating a database of fired
officers); Patrick McGreevy, Brown Signs Legislation to Protect Minorities from Racial Profiling
and Excessive Force, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.comlocal/politics/lame-pol-sac-brown-racial-profiling-20151004-story.html [http://perma.cc /6W3W-N2W6] (describing
California law requiring data collection about police stops and reports of police interactions that
cause serious injury or death). For a discussion of legislative activity around body cameras more

generally, see Kimberly Kindy et al., Of 138 Bills, Only Eight Provide a Pathway to Police Body
Cameras, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/bodycam-legislation/ [http: //perma.cc /H3VS-NG4J].
" For a discussion of the values of legislative investigation, see Mary M. Cheh, Legislative
Oversight of Police: Lessons Learned from an Investigation of Police Handling of Demonstrationsin
Washington, D.C., 32 J. LEGIS. 1 (2005).
87
See, e.g., Erica Goode, Sheriffs Refuse to Enforce Laws on Gun Control, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 15,
2013)

http: //www.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/us/sheriffs-refuse-to-enforce-laws-on-gun-control.html

[https:llperma.cc /2JPB-V9MJ] (describing sheriffs' refusal to follow Colorado gun control laws);
Hillary Niles, Despite Mandate, Traffic-Stop Race Data Remain Elusive in Vermont, SEVEN DAYS
VT. (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.sevendaysvt.com/vermont /despite-mandate-traffic-stop-race-dataremain-elusive-in-vermont /Content?oid=3111020 [https: //perma.cc /5FED-UTFA] (reporting that
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officials' leverage is limited also by the scope of their authority;
Congress cannot, for example, require local law enforcement agencies to
pass body camera laws.88 Congress can, however, provide grants to
encourage such laws be passed, and can condition federal money on
data collection or passage of policies. 9
Resources. Resources to enact laws and other regulations should
not be much of a problem for elected officials on a micro or macro level.
Governments have sufficient resources to pass laws regulating police
behavior, and there are elected officials around the country at federal,
state, and local levels situated to enact reforms that would impact
practices in every law enforcement agency around the country. The
most significant resource issue for elected officials concerns the cost of
implementing the reforms they enact. Because these costs do not
impact elected officials' power to pass laws regulating police behavior,
but may instead dampen elected officials' appetites to pass such laws, I
view this as more relevant to officials' motivations than to their
resources.
Motivation. Motivation is the most significant constraint for elected
officials. Officials are responsive to multiple constituencies, including
community groups pushing for reforms and law enforcement
organizations and unions opposing them. Even when elected officials
support reforms in theory, their motivation can be dampened by the
cost of implementation. Trainings, body cameras, data collection, and
internal affairs investigations all cost money, and if elected officials
pass laws requiring such changes they must also consider how to pay
for them. Of course, elected officials will also have to figure out how to
pay for these types of reforms if they are mandated by outside
entities-the DOJ or a public entity liability insurer, for example. But
when outsiders mandate these types of reforms, elected officials have
little choice but to comply. In contrast, elected officials deciding
whether to adopt reforms voluntarily will weigh the costs of reforms in
their calculations. 90 Government officials' motivation to enact police

Vermont requires police officers to record the race of people stopped, but the data collected is
"largely inaccessible" and "no one even knows if all of law enforcement is complying with the
mandate to collect the data in the first place.").
88 Gabrielle Levy, Congress Left Behind in Rush for Police Reform, U.S. NEWS (May 5, 2015,
4:23 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/05/05/congress-left-behind-in-rush-for-policereform [http://perma.cc /HU6K-KEA2] (describing the limits of Congressional power to pass police
reforms).
8
Id. (reporting that Congress could but has not yet conditioned grants to the police "based
on state and local compliance with training and prosecutorial recommendations or . . . thorough
data collection on police-caused deaths.").
9 See, e.g., Steven Deere, Ferguson Consent Decree May Be Derailed Because of Cost,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 7, 2016), http: //www.stltoday.com/news/local/ferguson-consent-
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reform measures depends, then, on the salience of conflicting pressures
regarding the need for and consequences of those reforms. 91
D.

Reformers Whose Qualities Depend on the Government Officials
Who Created Them

Finally, I consider two types of reformers-blue ribbon
commissions and civilian oversight bodies-whose motivations,
resources, and leverage depend to a significant extent on the manner in
which these entities are created and staffed. Despite this variability,
both types of reformers consistently have insufficient leverage to
demand adoption of the reforms they recommend.
1. Blue ribbon commissions.
For over a century, elected officials have responded to concerns
about police misconduct by creating commissions to investigate and
report on the extent and underlying causes of that misconduct. 92 These
commissions are sometimes referred to as "blue ribbon commissions"
given the credentials of those usually appointed to serve on them.
Often, commissions are formed to investigate policing practices in
individual departments. 93 Sometimes, commissions are formed to
examine policing issues nationwide. 94 Commissions' reports generally
describe the policing practices they have observed and offer
recommendations to address the problems that they find.

decree-may-be-derailed-because-of-cost /article_5ca4l3ad-9ldl-5874-ab74-e595bd0205ce.html
[https: //perma.cc /6MBK-X6MX] (describing city council opposition to reforms proposed by the
DOJ because of their costs); Jake Grovum, States Struggle to Pay for Police Body Cameras, PEW
CHARITABLE

TRUSTS

(May

1,

2015),

http://www.pewtrusts.org /en/research-and-analysis/

blogs/stateline/2015/5/01/states-struggle-to-pay-for-police-body-cameras
[http://perma.cc /DLE2TBJX] (describing difficulties funding police body cameras).
" The relative salience of conflicting pressures can shift quickly. In Chicago, for example, the
City Council voted unanimously to approve its agreement with the police union in 2014. After
video was released of the shooting of Laquan McDonald, in November 2015, the City Council's
Black Caucus "vowed to work with other caucuses and other of [their] colleagues to review the
FOP contract to make sure there are tougher policies and sanctions against police officers who do

egregious or illegal acts." Steven Cohen, The Next Fight for Racial Justice: Police Union Reform,
NEW REPUBLIC (Dec.

2, 2015),

https://newrepublic.com/article/124811/next-fight-racial-justice-

police-union-reform [https: //perma.cc /PAN6-7366].
92 See Hon. Harold Baer, Jr. & Joseph P. Armao,
The Mollen Commission Report: An
Overview, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 73, 73 (1995) (describing twenty-year cycles of "corruption,
scandal, reform, backslide, and fresh scandal" in New York City dating back to the Lexow
Committee Report of 1894).
9 See, e.g., id. (describing a series of commissions investigating the New York City Police
Department).
94 See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING,
supra note 3.
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Motivation. The strength of the motivations of blue ribbon
commissions depends to a significant extent on the motivations of the
individuals appointed to serve on those commissions-which depends,
in turn, on the motivations of the government officials who appoint the
commissioners. Some blue ribbon commissions have been criticized for
the motivations of their leaders. For example, the blue ribbon
commission appointed by California Governor Pat Brown to investigate
the causes of the Watts rebellion wrote a report that has been
95
characterized as "a compromise at best, a whitewash at worst." The
limitations of the report have been attributed in part to the chairman of
the blue ribbon commission, John McCone, described as a "conservative
Los Angeles figure" appointed by Governor Brown "to mollify
conservatives. "96
In contrast, the blue ribbon commission appointed by Los Angeles
Mayor Tom Bradley to investigate the Los Angeles Police Department
following the beating of Rodney King wrote a report described as a
97
"harsh indictment of the Los Angeles Police Department" and was
98
praised for its "unanimous call for its sweeping reform." Those who
consider that commission successful attribute its success in no small
part to the temperament, drive, and talents of the chairman of the
commission, Warren Christopher. 9 To be sure, not everyone agrees
that the Christopher Commission was a success; it too has been called a
"white wash."1 00 But the broader point remains-a commission's
motivation to unearth underlying causes of dysfunctional policing and
recommend reforms depends on the motivations of its leader and
members. Much, therefore, rests on the preferences of the government
officials who appoint the members of the commission.
Resources. Government officials who decide whether to convene a
blue ribbon commission also determine what resources the commission
95 Bill Boyarsky, Echoes of the McCone Commission, L.A. TIMES (May 3, 1991),
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-05-03/locallme-1112_1_christopher-commission [https://perma.cc/
3UTN-L7BDI; see also Report on Watts Rioting Assailed by California Group, SPARTANBURG
HERALD-JOURNAL, Jan. 23, 1966, at A6 (describing critical findings about the McCone Commission
Report by the California Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights).
See Boyarsky, supra note 95.
Robert Reinhold, Violence and Racism Are Routine in Los Angeles Police, Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 1991), https://www.nytimes.comlbooks/98/02/08/home/rodney-report.html
[https://perma.cc /SA9T-LAWA].
98 Frank Stoltze, Warren Christopher'sLegacy in Los Angeles, CAL. REP. (Mar. 25-27, 2011),
http://audio.californiareport.org /archive/R201103251630/c [https://perma.cc /5JDJ-BBGJ].
9
9

9

Id.
Michael Novick, From the Archives: LA's Christopher Commission: Elite Blueprint for
'Enlightened'Repression, DE-COLONIZE L.A. (May 24, 2015, 2:32 PST), http://ara-la.tumblr.com/
[https://perma.cc /MXG4post / 119751320415/from-the-archives-las-christopher-commission
EHNP].
10
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will have to do its work. At a micro level, commissions are typically
required to work quickly and diligently, but are also typically given a
large staff to help accomplish their goals. The McCone Commission had
100 days to do its work and during that time the members of the
commission interviewed 530 witnesses and held sixty-four meetings;
the seventy-member staff reported working twelve- to fourteen-hour
days. 10 1 The Christopher Commission also had 100 days to produce a
report and, during that time, its staff of more than sixty lawyers spoke
with more than fifty expert witnesses and more than 150 community
representatives, interviewed more than 500 current and former Los
Angeles Police officers, and studied voluminous data including four
years of use of force reports and civilian complaints. 102 Although blue
ribbon commissions generally have sufficient resources to do their
work, there are relatively few blue ribbon commissions convened to
evaluate law enforcement agency practices, making them underresourced at a macro level.
Leverage. Blue ribbon commissions likely suffer most for their lack
of leverage over law enforcement agencies. Unlike the DOJ, which has
the power of judicial oversight to force agencies to undertake policy and
organizational changes, blue ribbon commissions have no power to
demand that law enforcement agencies undertake recommended
changes. 103 There may be political pressure for a law enforcement
agency to adopt changes recommended by a commission, but the
commission itself does not have power to order that changes occur.
Moreover, commissions are temporary; once a commission is disbanded
and government and press attention is drawn to other issues, the
commission's recommendations may fall by the wayside. 104 For these
reasons they are, as Laurie Levenson has written, "more likely to serve
as a historical chronicle of police abuse, rather than a cure."10 5

'' Daniel Dawsey, 25 Years After the Watts Riots: McCone Commission's Recommendations
Have Gone Unheeded, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 1990), http://articles.atimes.com/1990-07-08/ocalme455_1 watts-riots [https: //perma.cc /978U-TCCN].
102 INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT ii-iii (1991).
0 See Walker, supra note 25, at 21 (concluding that blue ribbon commissions "suffer from one
inherent weakness: they lack the capacity to implement their own recommendations. By their very
nature, commissions are temporary bodies that disband once the final report is released. Reports
typically lie on the shelf with their recommendations unimplemented. . . . Before long, the political
momentum for reform wanes, as the original crises fades into memory and public attention,
particularly the attention of the news media moves on to new crises.").
'0 See SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
52 (2d ed. 2014) (describing limitations of blue ribbon commissions).
10' Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1, 13 (2001).
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2. Civilian overseers.
Over the past few decades, civilian oversight has emerged as a
means of advancing police reforms. There are hundreds of civilian
oversight agencies across the United States that review civilian
106
complaints and/or audit law enforcement practices more generally.
Civilian overseers take a wide variety of forms, with differences in the
size of their staff and budgets, as well as their qualifications,
responsibilities, authority, access to information, and reporting
structure. 107 The two main categories of civilian overseers are civilian
review boards and civilian auditors. Civilian review boards are
generally charged with investigating civilian complaints. In the
alternative or in addition, jurisdictions may appoint civilian auditors to
review not only allegations of individual officer wrongdoing, but also
police practices more generally. 108
Motivation. Some civilian overseers are criticized for being overly
sympathetic to law enforcement, and others are criticized for being
overly hostile. This variation may be attributable in part to differences
in the nature of overseers' responsibilities. Some overseers are expected
to work with multiple entities; the law enforcement agency they are
109
charged with supervising, the mayor or city council, and the public.
Overseer bodies may be structured in this way as a means of bridging
'0 See Martin Kaste, Police Are Learning to Accept Civilian Oversight, but Distrust Lingers,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 24, 2015, 1:33 AM ET), http://www.npr.org 12015/02/21/387770044/
[https: /perma.cc /8ANDpolice-are-learning-to-accept-civilian-oversight-but-distrust-lingers
H95Q].
107
See Erika Aguilar, SoCal Cities Debate the Pros and Cons of Police Oversight Models, 89.3
KPCC (July 30, 2015), http://www.sepr.org /news/2015/07/30/53450/socal-cities-debate-the-prosand-cons-of-police-ov/ [http: /perma.cc /724K-BLNN] (reporting "more than 200 models of police
oversight to choose from").
'08 See WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 104, at 55. Civilian auditors are also sometimes
referred to as a monitor or inspector general. See Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police:
Wresting with the Problems of Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 615, 641 ("In 1993 a new form of
citizen oversight appeared as an alternative to the traditional citizen review board . .. combining
the functions of traditional review boards with those of auditor/inspectors general[.]").
109 See Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight in the United States, 15, http://capg.ca/wpcontent /uploads/2013/05/Civilian-Oversight-of-the-Police-in-the-United-States-M.Bobb_.pdf
[http://perma.cc /YP93-YPKP] ("Monitors are accountable to different constituencies. First, each is
accountable to the law enforcement agency to provide assistance or reports calculated to focus
police management on internal decision-making, policy formulation, and efforts to responsibly
anticipate and manage liability risk. More importantly, a monitor is accountable to the public at
large to provide a thorough and fair appraisal of law enforcement, and to make the heretofore
mystery-shrouded, internal processes of the police more transparent and comprehensible."); Chris
Stone, Get the Politics Out of Policing, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://medium.com/open-society-foundations/get-the-politics-out-of-policingfa4ldfO2O6c9#.hzyljjgcl [http://perma.cc /U29V-8DA8] (criticizing the civilian auditor in Chicago
and advocating for an independent body to investigate officer involved shootings and share
information with prosecutors and the public).
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the gap between these constituencies. But this feature can also be a
bug: Chicago's auditor has been criticized for becoming co-opted by law
enforcement. 110 Other civilian overseers have a narrower role-to
evaluate allegations of police misconduct-and are not expected to
collaborate with the law enforcement agency they oversee, reducing the
likelihood of mixed motivations. Yet, even with this more
straightforward arrangement, overseers have been criticized for their
lack of motivation.'
Elected officials are often responsible for
appointing auditors and board members, and those officials' need to
respond to multiple constituencies may lead them to appoint people
with tepid or mixed motivations. 112
Resources. As with blue ribbon commissions, government officials
decide whether to create civilian review boards and auditors, and how
many dollars and staff members their overseer should have. The
amount of resources civilian overseers need depends in part on their
roles and responsibilities. Overseers with subpoena power and the
authority to conduct their own investigations will need more resources
than overseers who have authority only to review investigations that
have been conducted by the police department's internal affairs
division.1 13 Some auditors appear to have sufficient resources to do
meaningful work. 114 Other civilian overseers have been criticized for
not having the resources-measured in dollars and staff-to effectively
exercise the oversight authority they possess.1 15
"o See Monica Davey & Timothy Williams, Chicago Pays Millions but Punishes Fewh in
Killings by Police, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/us/chicagopays-millions-but-punishes-few-in-police-killings.html [https: //perma.cc /65SX-Z68N].
. See, e.g., Andrew J. Tobias, U.S. Department of Justice Criticizes Cleveland Police
Department's Civilian Review Board as Opaque, Ineffective, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Dec. 4,
2014), http://www.cleveland.comlforcing-change/index.ssf/2014/12/us.department-of-justice-criti.
html [https://perma.ce /3KK2-V7KF] (reporting that Cleveland's Civilian Review Board has "wideranging power ...
including the ability to issue subpoenas and compel witnesses" but was
criticized by the DOJ for its inadequate reviews and lack of transparency).
112 For further discussion of this possibility, see Walker, supra note 108.
"
See THE CATO INSTITUTE'S NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT, CIVILIAN
BOARDS, http: /www.policemisconduct.net /explainers/civilian-review-boards/
[https://perma.cc/
B45A-KKK3].
114
See infra note 174 and accompanying text (describing recommendations
made by civilian
overseers and adopted by local governments).
"5 Id.; see also Todd Lighty et al., Chicago'sFlawed System for Investigating Police Shootings,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2015, 1:35 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-chicagopolice-accountability-20151204-story.html [http://perma.cc IN432-SUCS] ("Studies, including a
December 2014 review by former federal prosecutor Ronald Safer, have found that [the Chicago
monitor's] caseloads are too large, while critics and even some supporters say its investigators are
overmatched in cases that can be complex."); Gary L. Wright & Fred Clasen-Kelly, CMPD Review
Panel Rules Against Citizens-Every Time, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 16, 2013, 8:56 PM), http://
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article9086771.html
[http://perma.cc /7PAQ-DACT]
(quoting the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado as saying that, in
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Civilian overseers' macro-level resources fall somewhere in the
middle of the range of current reformers. There have been far more
civilian oversight bodies created than there have been DOJ
investigations.1 1 6 On the other hand, there are fewer resources for
civilian oversight at a macro level than there are for criminal
prosecutors and defendants.11 7
Leverage. Civilian overseers, like blue ribbon commissions, have
limited leverage over law enforcement agencies. Although civilian
boards can investigate allegations of misconduct, none can impose their
own discipline; the most they can do is recommend to the chief of police
that an officer be disciplined. 118 Similarly, civilian auditors do not have
direct leverage over law enforcement. Civilian auditors are not in the
law enforcement agency's chain of command and instead report on their
findings to the city council or mayor. 119 Like blue ribbon commissions,
civilian auditors can draw the attention of government officials to
problems and recommend reforms, but they cannot compel law
enforcement agencies to adopt their recommendations. 1 20
E.

Conclusion

This Part has described the leverage, motivation, and resources
possessed by nine police reformers. One could quibble with the ways in
which I have characterized reformers' strengths and weaknesses with
regard to each of these qualities. My descriptions additionally
generalize about the strengths and limitations of various reformers:
Not all prosecutors, for example, have motivations constrained by
allegiances to law enforcement. 121 My descriptions in this Part are not
many cities, civilian review boards are "underfunded and understaffed").
n6 The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) lists 135
oversight organizations on its website. See Nat'l Assoc. for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement,
Police Oversight by Jurisdiction, http: //www.nacole.org /police-oversight-byjurisdiction-usa
[https://perma.cc /RW3U-ZFTS] (last visited July 23, 2016). In contrast, the DOJ has investigated
approximately sixty-seven law enforcement agencies. See Kelly et al., supra note 23.
117
See supra notes 63 (describing criminal defendants' macro-level resources) & 80 (describing
prosecutors' macro-level resources).
"s See Walker, supra note 108, at 635 ("From the perspective of the Schwartz Framework,
review boards have no Leverage whatsoever. They can make recommendations regarding the
disposition of citizen complaints, but have no power to compel a disposition or disciplinary action."
And "Auditors/inspector generals do not have the power to compel implementation of their
recommendations.").
"' For a description of police auditor model and reporting structure, see Walker, supra note
25, at 24-25.
12o WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 104, at 195.
121
For example, "[n]o one could accuse Baltimore state's attorney Marilyn Mosby of dragging
her feet on the decision to file charges over the death of Freddie Gray, who suffered a fatal spinal
injury in police custody on April 12 [2015]." Editorial, A Prosecutor's Rush to Judgment in
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meant to be definitive assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of
each of these reformers. Instead, they are intended to situate familiar
observations about reformers' strengths and weaknesses within a
consistent framework-as observations about leverage, motivation, and
resources.
Viewing reformers' characteristics in terms of leverage, motivation,
and resources helps to illuminate their comparative strengths and
weaknesses. Some reformers have lots of leverage but limited
resources-the DOJ and public entity liability insurers fall into this
category. Other reformers have strong motivations but limited
leverage-civil plaintiffs, criminal defendants, and non-governmental
actors should be included in this group. Some reformers have lots of
leverage but mixed motivations, including prosecutors and elected
officials. And some reformers' leverage, motivation, and resources are
dependent on the elected officials responsible for creating them-blue
ribbon commissions and civilian overseers.

Baltimore, CHI. TRIB. (May 1, 2015, 7:31 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/
editorials/ct-baltimore-police-mosby-homicide-charges-freddie-gray-riot-edit-0503-jm-20150501story.html [http://perma.cc /22UL-CLRV]. Instead, officers charged in the case sought to get Mosby
removed on the ground that she brought the charges for personal and political gain. See Oliver
Laughland & Jon Swaine, Baltimore: Freddie Gray Police Threaten to Sue State's Attorney Marilyn
Mosby, GUARDIAN (May 8, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/08/baltimorefreddie-gray-police-threaten-to-sue-marilyn-mosby
[http://perma.cc /C7SA-W3QR]. The motion
was denied. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Baltimore Judge Lets Officers' Charges Stand and Refuses to
Remove Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/us/hearing-

baltimore-freddie-gray.html [https: //perma.cc /MNT4-FAP4].
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REFORMERS' RELATIVE LEVERAGE, MOTIVATION, AND RESOURCES
Leverage

Mvation

Resources
(Micro)

Resources
(Macro)

Department of
Justice
Liability Insurers

Civil Plaintiffs
Criminal Defendants
Non- Governmental

ActorsIL
Criminal
Prosecutors

Elected Officials
Blue Ribbon
Commissions
Civil Overseers

This Table attempts to illustrate reformers' relative leverage,
motivation, and resources. The darkest colored cells represent areas of
the most strength and the lightest cells represent areas of greatest
weakness. Cells with diagonal lines represent areas especially likely to
fluctuate depending on shifts in political will.
IV. INNOVATIONS

Having described the strengths and limitations of various police
reformers' leverage, motivation, and resources, I now offer two
suggestions-inspired by this framework and its application-to
improve reformers' efficacy. First, reformers' leverage, motivation, and
resources should be adjusted to address their weaknesses. Second,
police reformers with complementary strengths and weaknesses should
collaborate.
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Adjust Reformers' Leverage, Motivation, and Resources

I have argued that most police reformers are lacking in one or more
of three important qualities-leverage, motivation, or resources. One
possible response is to adjust the characteristics or powers of each of
these entities to strengthen them in the areas in which they are
lacking.122 As illustrations of this approach, the following are
suggestions to increase the leverage of civil plaintiffs, the motivations
of prosecutors, and the resources of the DOJ. Similar adjustments could
be made to other reformers to shore up their leverage, motivation, and
resources.
1. Increasing the leverage of civil plaintiffs.
Civil plaintiffs and their attorneys have insufficient leverage over
law enforcement officers and agencies-officers and agencies are rarely
sued, stringent legal standards make it difficult for plaintiffs to prevail,
and even when plaintiffs do prevail, money awarded in civil damages
actions is rarely taken from the pockets of officers or the budgets of law
enforcement agencies. 123 There are multiple ways of increasing civil
plaintiffs' leverage, although some adjustments are less realistic than
others. For example, plaintiffs and their attorneys would presumably
have more leverage over law enforcement if qualified immunity were
eliminated but-given recent Supreme Court decisions-those
advocating for this adjustment should not hold their breath. 124 A more
realistic avenue to increase civil plaintiffs' leverage may be to require
individual officers and law enforcement agencies to bear more financial
costs of liability.12 5

"' I have focused here on ways to strengthen reformers in areas of relative weakness. It might
also be that enhancing a reformer in an area of relative strength will increase its effectiveness. For
example, I have suggested that prosecutors' greatest weakness is their motivation, but have noted

that stringent legal standards for criminal liability limit prosecutors' leverage to some extent. One
option to increase prosecutors' effectiveness is to increase their motivation, as I discuss infra notes
133-135 and accompanying text. An alternative way to increase prosecutors' effectiveness might

be to further strengthen their leverage. Presumably, if legal standards for criminal liability were
reduced, prosecutors' mixed motivations would matter less. For suggestions about how to adjust
criminal standards, see Bedi, supra note 77.
12
As described supra notes 35, 41-42 and accompanying text, insurers can impose financial
pressures on law enforcement agencies and jurisdictions resulting from lawsuits, but do not insure

the largest law enforcement agencies that are the presumptive targets of the vast majority of
police litigation. See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1210.
124
See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 310-11 (2015) (holding that
an officer who shot
and killed someone in their car, despite a less-lethal available alternative and against the explicit
instruction of a supervisor, did not violate clearly established law and so was entitled to qualified
immunity).
i'
For more detailed articulations of this suggestion see Schwartz, supra note 46, at 954;
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Local governments are currently experimenting with approaches to
make their law enforcement officers and agencies feel the financial
effects of payouts. In prior research, I found that law enforcement
officers employed by eighty-one law enforcement agencies across the
country are virtually always indemnified, meaning that they almost
never contribute financially to settlements and judgments in cases
brought against them. 126 Yet I did find two jurisdictions-New York
City and Cleveland-that occasionally require officers to contribute to
settlements. 127 In New York City, it appears that the City's Comptroller
negotiates for these contributions as a form of punishment when the
Internal Affairs Bureau or the Civilian Complaint Review Board has
128
substantiated an allegation of misconduct.
In another study, I found that the majority of large, self-insured
jurisdictions pay settlements and judgments with no financial
consequences for the involved law enforcement agencies. But I did find
ten jurisdictions that require their law enforcement agencies to pay
settlements and judgments from their budgets and must take money
from other budgetary needs when their litigation costs are higher than
expected, and also allow their law enforcement agencies to use the
129
I
surplus when they spend less than expected on lawsuits.
additionally found six jurisdictions that require their law enforcement
agencies to contribute to a jurisdiction-wide central risk management
fund; these agencies adjust their payments based on their liability risk,
and experience tangible financial consequences of these increases and
decreases. 130 Although making law enforcement agencies bear the costs
of settlements and judgments does not eliminate misconduct in these
agencies, this budgetary arrangement does appear to serve as
additional encouragement to law enforcement policymakers and
supervisors to examine and respond to liability risks. 131 Presumably,
requiring officers to contribute to settlements and judgments when
they have engaged in misconduct will also increase civil plaintiffs'
leverage. Jurisdictions should continue to experiment with both
approaches, and examine the impact of these budgetary arrangements
on the behaviors of agencies and officers.

Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1207-08.
16
See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 912.
See id. at 954 (describing practices in New York City and Cleveland).
12
See id. at 928.
'"
129 See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1180.
30

See id. at 1186.

"'

See id. at 1202.
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2. Strengthening prosecutors' motivations.
Prosecutors suffer from conflicting motivations; they rely on police

officers to assist in criminal prosecutions and may, therefore, be wary
of bringing criminal charges against them. Accordingly, many have
argued that prosecutors investigating police misconduct should be
independent-not reliant on cooperation with that jurisdiction's law
enforcement officers for their other prosecutions. 132 This notion appears
to be gaining traction in several jurisdictions. New York State has
announced that the State's Attorney General's office will investigate
police-involved deaths when the victims were unarmed. 133 State and
federal legislators have introduced bills that would require independent
prosecutors to investigate police-involved killings and decide whether
police should be criminally charged.134 Other states require
independent investigations of police-involved killings with information
about the incident then turned over to local prosecutors. 135 By
separating the powers and responsibilities of prosecutors-with one
prosecutor's office investigating and prosecuting police officers who
have violated the law, and another prosecutor's office collaborating
with law enforcement officers on other types of criminal prosecutionsm

Commentators may disagree about how "independent" an independent prosecutor should

be-whether prosecutorial power should be delegated to a permanent special prosecutor, to. the
state attorney general, or to individuals appointed on an ad hoc basis. Editorial Board, Police
Abuse Cases Need Special Prosecutors, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014), httpsJ/www.washinton
post.com/opinions/police-abuse-cases-need-special-prosecutors/2014/12/06/fcf57e28-7cd6-11e4-b821
-503cc7efed9estory.html [httpsJ/perma.cc /4XUJR-3QDT].
133

See Mark Berman, New York Will Have a Special ProsecutorLook into Some Deaths
at the

Hands of Police, WASH.
nation/wp/2015/0

7

POST (July

10,

2015),

httpsJ/www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-

/10/new-york-will-have-a-special-prosecutor-look-into-some-deaths-at-the-hands

-of-police/ [http://perma.cc/Z4M6-Y6PA]

(describing an executive order by Governor Cuomo that

the State's Attorney General's office will investigate police-involved killings when the victim was
unarmed).
See, e.g., Greg Hinz, Congressmen Want Independent Prosecutorsin Police Shooting Cases,

CRAIN'S (Dec. 11. 2015), http/www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20151211/BLOGSO2/151219965/
congressmen-want-independent-prosecutors-in-police-shooting-cases [http://perma.cc/F5JL-RGQB]
(describing bill that would cause jurisdictions to lose federal funds if they failed to turn over
police-involved killings to independent prosecutors); Dennis Romero, Law Would Create
Independent Prosecutor for Deadly Police Shootings, L.A. WEEKLY (June 10, 2015),
http: /www.laweekly.com/news/law-would-create-independent-prosecutor-for-deadly-cop-shootings-

5669987 [http://perma.cc /B8NX-K7VP]

(describing California State Assembly bill that would

create independent prosecutor who would investigate police shootings, quoting Assemblyman
Kevin McCarty as saying "District attorneys will no longer have to worry about investigating the

police with whom they work so closely. . . . No one should be able to police themselves."); Holly Yan
& Ashley Fantz, Police Kill Teen: Why Wisconsin's Investigation Will Be Different, CNN (Mar. 10,
2015,
12:48
PM
ET),
httpJ/www.cnn.com/20 15/03/10/us/wisconsin-police-shooting-rules/
[http://perma.cc/83YE-HAUN] (reporting that twelve states "have proposed measures about
appointing special prosecutors for, or providing independent investigation in, officer-involved
deaths").
13
See Yan & Fantz, supra note 134.
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prosecutors can discharge both responsibilities without conflicting
motivations.
3. Stretching the Department of Justice's resources.
The DOJ has a great deal of leverage and motivation, but is
constrained by limited resources. Although the DOJ could benefit from
more attorneys to conduct more investigations, and regularly seeks
additional funding from Congress for this purpose, the DOJ's resource
problems cannot be solved with more money alone. As Attorney
General Lynch has observed, the DOJ "cannot litigate [its] way out of
this problem .

.

. it is not the Department's intention to engage in an

investigation or a review of every police department across the
country." 136
The DOJ has stretched their available resources by creating
additional programs to work with the law enforcement agencies that
are seeking to improve. President Obama created an alternative
program in the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office for
law enforcement agencies interested in reform. 137 The COPS office's
work may require fewer resources, but it also creates less leverage; it
"has no legally-binding authority and relies on the consent of local
leaders who may be reluctant to agree to major overhauls that could
include their firing." 138 Similarly, the DOJ has a Community Relations
Service, described as the Department's "Peacemaker," that works to
1 39
resolve tensions between law enforcement agencies and communities.
Like the COPS office, the Community Relations Service has no leverage
over agencies; it "is not an investigatory or prosecutorial agency, and it
does not have any law enforcement authority." 140
An alternative approach may be for the DOJ to use its
investigations and prosecutions to impact practices in more agencies.
For example, Rachel Harmon has proposed a three-part strategy to
address the DOJ's resource limitations: Sue the worst large law
enforcement agencies; create a safe-harbor provision for law
136

Carrie Johnson,

137

id.

138

id.

Justice Department Hopes Investigation Will Create a "Stronger"
Baltimore, NPR (May 8, 2015, 4:15 ET), http: //www.npr.org /sections/itsallpolitics/2015/05/08/
405246568/justice-dept-hopes-police-investigation-will-create-a-stronger-baltimore
[https: /perma.cc/52J2-9SM3].

1a9 Dan Hinkel, Feds to Help Waukegan Police Repair Strained Relations with Community,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 29, 2015), http: //www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-waukegan-policefederal-intervention-met-20151229-story.html [https://perma.cc /8PLZ-ZGS7].
140

What

We Do, DEP'T OF JUSTICE CMTY. RELATIONS SERV., https:I/www.justice.gov/crs

[https://perma.cc /ML4S-N9B9].
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enforcement agencies that agree to implement a standard set of
reforms and demonstrate their progress toward meeting these reforms;
and provide departments with information about common law
enforcement problems and strategies to address those problems. 141 This
proposal does not entirely address the DOJ's resource constraints-as
Harmon recognizes, it would be challenging to identify which
departments are the worst, and reforms designed for the largest
departments might not be appropriate for the vast majority of law
enforcement agencies, which are small. 142 But Harmon's proposed
approach does address some of the Department's resource constraints.
And, as the next Subpart will describe, collaboration with other
reformers could fill some of the remaining gaps. 143
B.

Coordinate Reform Efforts

A second approach to strengthen the efficacy of police reformers is
for each to coordinate with other reformers that have complementary
strengths. The suggestion that reformers work in partnership or in
parallel is far from novel. Although I have, thus far, focused on the
strengths and limitations of individual police reformers, they rarely
operate in isolation. Indeed, each of the reformers I described in Part II
has been engaged in some way in police reform efforts following recent
high-profile killings by police. For example, following the death of
Freddie Gray in Baltimore, the DOJ opened an investigation of the
Baltimore Police Department; the local prosecutor filed criminal
charges against the involved officers; Gray's survivors negotiated a: $6.4
million wrongful death settlement; the Maryland Attorney General
passed guidelines restricting racial profiling; and the mayor sought
additional funding for the city's much-criticized civilian review board. 144
14'
42
141

Harmon, supra note 25, at 36-42.
See id. at 5-6.
See infra Part TV.B.3.

' For a discussion of the DOJ investigation and criminal charges brought against officers
involved in Freddie Gray's death, see Matt Apuzzo & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Justice Department
Will Investigate Baltimore Police Practices, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
20 15/05/08/us/politics/justice-department-will-investigate-baltimore-police-practices-after-freddiegray-case.html?-r=0 [https://perma.cc /WGZ4-23YU]. For a description of the civil settlement, see
Keith L. Alexander, Baltimore Reaches $6.4 Million Settlement with Freddie Gray's Family, WASH.
POST (Sept. 8, 2015), https: //www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/baltimore-reaches-64-millionsettlement-with-freddie-grays-family/2015/09/08/80b2cO92-5 196-11e5-8c19-0b6825aa4a3a-story.
html [http://perma.cc /2WY7-AKYQ]. For a description of the Maryland Attorney General's
guidelines, see Kevin Rector & Michael Dresser, Amid National Law Enforcement Debate, Md.
Attorney General Condemns Police Profiling, BALT. SUN (Aug. 25, 2015, 7:27 AM),
http: //www.baltimoresun.cominews/maryland/bs-md-police-training-and-policies20150825-story.

html [http://perma.cc /CZ57-YNZE]. For a description of additional funding sought for the civilian
review board, see Yvonne Wenger & Luke Broadwater, Rawlings-Blake Seeks $2 Million for
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Under such circumstances, it is difficult to isolate and assess the
effectiveness of individual reformers. The more apt question in such
circumstances may be whether this constellation of reformers together
has sufficient leverage, motivation, and resources to successfully
advance reforms.
Some police reformers regularly collaborate not only following
high-profile tragedies like the death of Freddie Gray, but also in the
regular course of their work. For example, the work of blue ribbon
commissions, civilian overseers, and elected officials are already closely
intertwined. Elected officials convene blue ribbon commissions to
evaluate troubled police departments; those blue ribbon commissions'
recommendations often include the appointment of a civilian overseer;
the civilian overseer, once appointed, recommends police reforms; and
elected officials may then adopt those reforms.
This collaboration makes sense-blue ribbon commissions and
civilian overseers have similar strengths and weaknesses that
complement those possessed by elected officials. Blue ribbon
commissions and civilian overseers may have strong motivations to
recommend reforms, but lack leverage to demand that reforms be
enacted. Elected officials have leverage to demand reforms but
motivations that are guided by the interests of their constituentsinterests that historically have not placed police reforms at the top of
officials' agendas. 145 In some instances, elected officials may be
motivated to engage in police reforms and they rely on reports and
recommendations by blue ribbon commissions and auditors to
determine which reforms are best.146 In other instances, the reports and
recommendations of blue ribbon commissions and civilian overseers
may increase public pressure on elected officials-and thus, officials'
motivation-to enact those reforms.
Below, I describe four additional collaborations between police
reformers with complementary strengths. These collaborations are
between: (1) elected officials and the media, (2) public defenders and
criminal prosecutors, (3) the DOJ and civil plaintiffs, and (4) civilian
overseers and liability insurers. Some of these collaborations are
already in place and others are suggestions that reformers could adopt.
Some are voluntary collaborations by two reformers, and others are
involuntary-one reformer takes advantage of another without their

Lawyers to Respond to U.S. Probe of Police, BALT. SUN (Dec. 7, 2015, 10:03 PM),
http: //www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-police-review-board-staff20151207-story.html [http: //perma.cc /T8QU-W7DR].
145 See supra notes 90-91 (describing mixed motivations of elected officials).
146
See supra Part II.E for a discussion of police reformers' roles in designing reforms.
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cooperation
or consent.
Each example
draws on reformers'
complementary strengths in the areas of leverage, motivation, and
resources.
1. Elected officials and media.
Elected officials have significant leverage to impose changes on law
enforcement, but have motivations that are guided by the interests of
constituents and other stakeholders who may not prioritize police
reforms. At least some members of the media have great motivation to
reveal relevant information about policing and the resources to do so,
but limited direct leverage to advance reforms. Recently, the motivation
and resources of two news outlets-The Washington Post and The
Guardian-combined with the leverage of the federal government to
improve federal data collection about police killings.
Commentators have long complained about the lack of good data
collected by federal agencies about law enforcement misconduct. 147 The
federal government has long had the authority to collect data from
police departments about police misconduct but has never exercised the
full power of its authority because, as Rachel Harmon has concluded,
"[t]he administrative agencies responsible for that data collection are
heavily influenced by law enforcement interests." 148 As one example,
the DOJ has long collected data about the number of people killed by
law enforcement officers each year, but has relied on law enforcement
agencies voluntarily to report killings when they occur. 149 The DOJ
considered the data it collected about officer-involved killings to b6 so
flawed that it suspended this data collection effort altogether in
2014.150
In 2015, The Washington Post and The Guardiancriticized the lack
of data collected by the federal government about the number of

See, e.g., Matthew J. Hickman et al., Toward a National Estimate
of Police Use of
Nonlethal Force, 7 CRIM. & PUB. POLY 563, 565 (2008); Colin Loftin et al., Underreportingof
Justifiable Homicides Committed by Police Officers in the United States, 1976-1998, 93 AM. J. OF
PUB. HEALTH 1117, 1119-20 (2003); Michael R. Smith, Toward a National Use-of-Force Data
147

Collection System: One Small (and Focused) Step Is Better than a Giant Leap, 7 CRIM. & PUB.

POL'Y 619, 621 (2008).
148
Harmon, supra note 3, at 1134.
14
Oliver Laughland et al., Justice Department Trials System to Count Killings by U.S. Law
Enforcement, GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015, 7:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
oct /05/justice-department-trials-system-count-killings-us-law-enforcement-the-counted
[http: //

perma.cc /KJG7-Q2LL]; Tom McCarthy, The Uncounted: Why the U.S. Can't Keep Track of People
Killed by Police, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2015, 10:19 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/mar/18/police-killings-government-data-count [http: //perma.cc /JT6D-BQJ8].
Iso See sources cited supra note 149 for a description of the DOJs decision to stop collecting
this data.
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civilians killed by law enforcement officers and began collecting their
own data about police killings. 15 ' As Frank Zimring has described, the
two newspapers' open-source data collection efforts revealed more than
double the number of police-involved killings than were reported
through the federal government's channels. 152
In October 2015, the U.S. Attorney General announced that it
would begin to collect open-source records about police killings and
then confirm reports with law enforcement agencies and others; a
process "near-identical to the one employed by" The Guardian.153 It
appears that the data collected by The Guardian and The Washington
Post not only provided the federal government with a workable
methodology, but also gave them the motivation to act. FBI Director
James Comey observed, when describing federal efforts to collect data,
that "it is 'ridiculous [and] embarrassing' that the Guardian and the
Washington Post ... were 'becoming the lead source of information
54
In other
about violent encounters between police and civilians.""

words, the information gathered and disseminated by The Guardian
and The Washington Post about police killings motivated the federal
government to improve its data collection efforts.
This is just one example of the influence of the media on elected
officials, offered because the causal relationship between the media's
reporting and elected officials' actions is so clear. There are, however,
many other instances in which press reports appear to be among the
reasons that elected officials decide to take action regarding law
enforcement.155

2. Criminal defendants and prosecutors.
Criminal defendants and their attorneys have resources on a
macro level, and strong motivations, but lack leverage. One reason for
criminal defendants' limited leverage is the fact that criminal
prosecutors in some jurisdictions do not collect information about
suppression decisions or findings of unconstitutional behavior by the
See Oliver Laughland & Jamiles Lartey, Counting Police Killings in the U.S.: Landmark
Stories That Led to Change, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2015, 12:50 AM) http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/dec /09/counting-police-killings-landmark-stories [http: //perma.cc /TGJ2-SJS6].
See Frank Zimring, How Many Killings by Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 691, 703-05
15
("Two newspapers are in the process of providing detailed accounts of each case of police
killings . . . at least double the levels reported in the SHR and Vital Statistics categories as well as
the most recently published ARD estimates.").
15 Laughland et al., supra note 149.
154 See Laughland & Lartey, supra note 151.
155 See, e.g., supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing the pressure press reports can
place on elected officials).
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police. Yet criminal prosecutors can use information about prior
suppression decisions to assert significant leverage over law
enforcement if they choose to do so. 15 6 A recent initiative in New York
City-the Legal Aid Society's Cop Accountability Database-combines
the motivation of criminal defendants with the leverage of criminal
prosecutors in ways that might lead to police reforms.1 57
Every day, criminal defendants are prosecuted based on the
testimony of police officers. Public defenders' best arguments for
suppression or against conviction are often associated with officers'
credibility on the stand. 15 8 And one of the best ways to undermine an
officer's credibility is to point to prior constitutional violations or
allegations of misconduct. Yet, in New York City and other
jurisdictions, public defenders are regularly denied requests for officers'
personnel records, internal affairs investigations, and reports that
might reveal misconduct.1 5 9 Even when they win their requests for an
officer's personnel records, these records may not contain crucial
information-including information about civilian complaints, civil
lawsuits, and criminal cases in which evidence was suppressed based
on concerns about the officer's credibility or conduct.16 0
The unmet need for information about allegations of police
misconduct caused the city's largest public defender's office-New York
City's Legal Aid Society-to begin collecting this information itself.
Started in 2014, the Cop Accountability Database includes information
from a number of different sources, including so-called Brady letters
156 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing
how prosecutors' Brady lists can
create leverage over police officers and officials).
1
See Leon Neyfakh, The Bad Cop Database, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2015, 11:43 AM),

http: /www.slate.comlarticles/news

and-politics/crime/2015/02/badcops-a-new-database

collects

information about cop misconductandprovides.html [http://perma.cc/YT93-RWWH].
158 See Jay Syrmopoulos, 100's ofAttorneys Build Tool
to Document Bad Cops: Introducing
"Cop

Accountability

Program",

THE

FREE

THOUGHT

PROJECT

(Feb.

18,

the

2015),

http:I/thefreethoughtproject.com/bad-cop-database/ [http://perma.cc /3KLD-M3FL].
159 See id. (describing the difficulty of getting police officers' disciplinary records under New
York law); David Uberti, How New York Protects Police Records from Public View, COLUMBIA
JOURNALISM REV. (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.cjr.org lb-roll/hownew-york protects-police r.php

[http://perma.cc /8RSZ-XYPU] (describing protections of investigations of officer misconduct
New York law); see also Jonathan Abel, Brady's Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in
Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743
(describing different practices regarding prosecutors' access to and use of information in
disciplinary files); BLACKS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT IN AMERICA,

under
Police
(2015)
police

Why It's Almost Impossible to

Reform America's Police (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.bleausa.org /why-its-almost-impossible-toreform-americas-police/ [https: /perma.cc /GD7K-ZU69] (reporting that police disciplinary records

are protected from disclosure under Maryland law); Robert Lewis et al., Is Police Misconduct a
Secret in Your State?, WNYC NEwS (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.wnyc.org /story/police-misconductrecords/ [https://perma.cc /MD43-JS7M] (surveying laws protecting disclosure of police disciplinary
history across the country).
'

See Uberti, supra note 159.
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containing exculpatory material (including evidence about officer
credibility and other officer misconduct) that is provided to criminal
defendants by prosecutors, information from civil lawsuits, findings at
criminal trials that officers were not credible, news reports about officer
wrongdoing, and complaints against officers filed with New York City's
Civilian Complaint Review Board. 161 When fully operational, the
database will have an accessible web interface that will be designed for
162
Public
smartphones and tablets for easy use in the courthouse.
defenders will be able to enter an arresting officer's last name (along
with other available identifiers) and the database will produce all the
163
information that has been collected about that officer.
Public defenders have strong motivations to collect and use this
information about law enforcement officers because the information
164
If a review of the data
will help them to represent their clients.
reveals numerous lawsuits against an arresting officer alleging
unconstitutional searches under similar circumstances, the attorney
could use those prior suits in a motion to suppress evidence illegally
seized by the officer. Prosecutors may decide to file lesser charges-or
drop charges altogether-after being confronted with Database records
regarding prior suppression hearing decisions, civilian complaints, and
other information that raise questions about the credibility of an
arresting officer.
Criminal defendants and public defenders generally have little
direct leverage over law enforcement officers. As described above,
decisions that announce new legal standards influence officers'
training, but agencies and officers may never learn of suppression
165
The Cop Accountability
decisions if prosecutors do not inform them.
Database, however, gives criminal defendants and their attorneys
access to information that may increase their likelihood of success in
suppression motions and may thereby cause prosecutors to use their
leverage to push for improvements in policing. Presumably, as public
defenders use this Database to challenge officers' arrests, some officers

161
Neyfakh, supra note 157 (describing the Database); Jason Tashea, Clicking for Complaints:
Databases Create Access to Police Misconduct Cases and Offer a Handy Tool for Defense Lawyers,
102 A.B.A. J. 17 (2016).
162
Neyfakh, supra note 157.

See id.
As Cynthia Conti-Cook, the creator of the Database,. has explained, evidence of officer
misconduct culled from the Database "takes the judge's attention away from what your client did
wrong to get here, and puts more of a burden on the police officer to prove that your client actually
did something." Id.
See supra note 68-70 and accompanying text (describing limited leverage of suppression
1'6
decisions when prosecutors do not keep track of them).
'63

'64

437]

WHO CAN POLICE THE POLICE?

481

may become hindrances to prosecutors trying to build their cases. 166
When this happens, prosecutors may pressure the NYPD to re-assign
or take action against officers whose past conduct makes it difficult for
them to take the stand. And perhaps this pressure from prosecutors
will serve as leverage to make the New York City Police Department
take some sort of action to better supervise or manage their officers.
There is some evidence that the Database is already having an
impact: the New York City Police Department has begun working with
local prosecutors to collect impeachment material on their officers that
would "minimize[e] the likelihood prosecutors will be surprised in
court." 16 7 Time will tell if the Cop Accountability Database also
encourages prosecutors to push for policing reforms.
3. The Department of Justice and civil plaintiffs.
The DOJ has significant leverage--it can sue law enforcement
agencies for injunctive relief and use the power of the court to ensure
that those changes are made. Yet the DOJ has limited resources and so
can pursue investigations of only a small number of agencies. Plaintiffs
and their attorneys have more resources on a macro level, but limited
leverage-rigorous standing requirements make it difficult for
individual plaintiffs to sue for injunctive relief and money awarded in
damages suits have limited impact on officers and agencies.
Collaborations between the DOJ and civil plaintiffs and their attorneys
could take advantage of the DOJ's leverage and plaintiffs' macro-level
resources.
One such collaboration, proposed by Myriam Gilles, would be to
amend Section 14141, which grants power to the DOJ to investigate
law enforcement agencies, to allow individuals to bring claims under
the statute alleging a pattern or practice of constitutional violations by
a law enforcement agency. 168 Gilles proposes that, following such an
amendment, victims of police misconduct could file a petition with the
DOJ. 169 The DOJ would then investigate the plaintiffs' claims and could
decide whether to quash the petition, proceed with the case on its own,

'
1

See, e.g., supra note 69 (describing prosecutors' uses of Brady lists).
Robert Lewis, When a Cop's Right to Privacy Undermines Our Right to a Fair Trial, WNYC

NEWS (Oct. 14, 2015), http: //www.wnyc.org /story/when-a-cops-right-to-privacy-undermines-our-

right-to-a-fair-trial [https://perma.cc /3GC8-8U8G].
'6
See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1418 (2000).
169
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or deputize the private citizen(s) to litigate the case pursuant to Section
14141.170

This arrangement would give civil plaintiffs' attorneys leverage
they would not otherwise have, as current standing requirements make
it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to bring cases seeking injunctive
relief against law enforcement agencies. 171 This arrangement would
also give the DOJ resources it does not otherwise have. Currently, the
DOJ employs fewer than twenty attorneys that conduct "pattern or
172
By allowing
practice" investigations of law enforcement agencies.
civil plaintiffs' attorneys to litigate these cases, the DOJ would increase
their person-power by orders of magnitude. Gilles contends that
plaintiffs' attorneys would be willing to bring these cases because
findings in these pattern and practice cases could have preclusive effect
in subsequent damages actions. 173 I would allow prevailing plaintiffs
bringing pattern and practice claims to recover attorneys' fees under
Section 1988 as an additional incentive. With or without the possibility
of attorneys' fees, this collaboration between the DOJ and civil
plaintiffs' attorneys would build on the strengths of each and mitigate
their corresponding weaknesses.
4. Civilian overseers and public entity liability insurers.
Another possible collaboration would be between civilian overseers
and public entity liability insurers. Civilian overseers often recommend
changes in policing policies and practices but do not have the leverage
to demand law enforcement agencies adopt those changes. Elected
officials have the leverage to demand that overseers' recommendations
be adopted-and sometimes they do. 174 But elected officials may not
have the motivation to demand such changes if it is not in their
political interest to do so.
Public entity liability insurers are well situated to use their
leverage to advance civilian overseers' proposed reforms. Public entity
liability insurers, like elected officials, have leverage over their

170

See id.
Id. at 1451. Note, however, that this suggestion-which seeks to get around the standing
requirements in Lyons-might be found unconstitutional for that very reason. See supra note 43
and accompanying text for a discussion of Lyons.
172
See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the resources of the DOJ).
173
Gilles, supra note 168, at 1451-52.
For example, Samuel Walker's contribution to this symposium describes reports written by
174
police auditors in Los Angeles County, San Jose, Washington, D.C., and New York City that
revealed problems in the departments' policies and practices that were subsequently corrected. See
Walker, supra note 108, at 646 ("The first police auditors in 1993 included ... significantly altered
the political dynamics in the city regarding the police.").
171

437]

WHO CAN POLICE THE POLICE?

483

insureds to demand policy and personnel changes recommended by
civilian overseers; they can limit coverage or deny it altogether if a
department does not comply with their demands.17 5 But public entity
liability insurers may sometimes have stronger motivations than
elected officials to demand that such changes be made. While elected
officials' motivations will be defined primarily by the interests of their
constituents and other government actors (including law enforcement),
public entity liability insurers are motivated primarily by financial
incentives-they want to take steps that will reduce their liability risk.
Some reforms recommended by overseers may be unpalatable to an
elected official, but embraced by an insurer motivated to reduce
liability costs.
Accordingly, civilian overseers should, when possible, work with
public entity liability insurers to advance their recommendations. 17 6
Not every overseer will be able to take advantage of insurers' leverage.
Indeed, this type of collaboration will only work if a civilian overseer is
in a jurisdiction that relies on public entity liability insurance.17 7 In
addition, this type of collaboration will only be effective if an insurer
views an overseer's recommendations as a promising means of reducing
liability costs. But if civilian overseers can convince insurers that their
recommended reforms will reduce liability risk, insurers can pressure
their insured departments to adopt those reforms. An insurer may
simply recommend that the insured departments adopt the overseer's
reforms, or may condition continued coverage or premium rates on
adoption of the reforms. Through this arrangement, insurers' leverage
is used to advance civilian overseers' recommendations.

17
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (describing the leverage of public entity
liability insurers).
17
John Rappaport has suggested a similar collaboration between public entity liability

insurers and state attorneys general. See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public

Police, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 3, 2016), http:I/clsbluesky.aw.columbia.edu/2016/03/03/
how-private-insurers-regulate-public-police/
[https://perma.ce /Q953-TDGW]
("Insurance
regulators could work with state attorneys general or other law enforcement experts to devise a

list of risk-related features that underwriters should (or must) consider when setting rates.").
17 Many overseers are located in self-insured jurisdictions like Los Angeles, Chicago, and New
York that are immune to the pressures of public entity liability insurers. This type of collaboration
will therefore be impossible in this type of large jurisdiction. There are, however, civilian oversight
agencies in a number of smaller jurisdictions that likely rely on insurance to some degree; this
proposal is directed to those types of jurisdictions. For a list of civilian oversight agencies, see Nat'l
Assoc. for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, supra note 116 (listing smaller jurisdictions
including Claremont, CA; Brattleboro, VT; Clarkstown, NY; Corvallis, OR; and Evanston, IL).
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Conclusion

All entities involved in efforts to reform the police need leverage,
motivation, and resources to do their work. Yet each entity engaged in
police reform efforts has weaknesses in one or more of these areas.
These weaknesses can be cured either by adjusting individual
reformers' powers and characteristics, or through collaborations
between reformers that have complementary strengths and
weaknesses. Some collaborations will be intentional and coordinatedsuch as the collaborations I have proposed between the DOJ and
plaintiffs, and civilian overseers and public entity liability insurers.
Others, like the Cop Accountability Database, are involuntary-one
reformer pushes another reformer to act, without their collaboration or
consent, and thereby takes advantage of their strengths. The four
examples of collaborations offered here are illustrative but many more
come to mind. The key to these proposed collaborations is that each
draws on reformers' complementary strengths in the areas of leverage,
motivation, and resources.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent police tragedies have focused national attention on the need
for police reform. This Essay offers a framework for understanding the
qualities that police reformers need; situates current commentary
about reformers within this framework; suggests several approaches to
strengthen reformers' leverage, motivation, and resources; and
recommends coordination between reformers to capitalize on their
strengths.
Although this Essay is focused on strategies for police reformers,
its lessons are not limited to those working to change law enforcement.
Reformers endeavoring to improve public school education, prison
conditions, immigrants' rights, or address any other governmental or
institutional concern need sufficient leverage, motivation, and
resources to succeed in their efforts. Recognizing the need for each of
these three qualities can guide strategies and collaborations in these
and other reform efforts.

